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Daniel Abowd* 
Sound recordings are not musical compositions. Sound record-
ings embody musical compositions. Thus, when sound recordings 
appear in musical composition infringement trials, they do so as an 
imperfect facsimile of the composition they actualize. As a  
result, they can confuse and mislead juries tasked only with evalu-
ating the similarity of the underlying composition. On the other 
hand, music is an aural medium: how can juries be expected  
to compare two songs without listening to their commercial  
embodiments? 
Several recent cases have hinged on the admissibility of sound 
recordings in composition infringement trials. In doing so, they have 
implicated three fundamental questions: (1) Where does composi-
tion end and sound recording begin? (2) How has the evolution of 
creative and business practices in the music industry compli- 
cated the formerly tidy separation of composition and perfor-
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mance/recording? (3) What are the policy implications for courts 
defining “composition” more broadly or more narrowly, and how 
do these interact with the underlying policies governing sound re-
cording evidentiary decisions? 
This Note targets a seemingly simple question: how should 
courts approach the use of sound recordings in composition  
infringement trials? Any thorough answer, however, must grapple 
with the many underlying creative, industry, and public policy com-
plexities that bear on that debate. Thus, this Note necessarily traces 
the historical convergence of composition and recording in creative, 
industry, and judicial contexts. It then discusses the underlying  
policy arguments that favor and oppose the unrestricted use of 
sound recordings in composition infringement trials. Finally, it  
marshals all of this context into a proposed “Triad” judicial frame-
work that explicitly links a court’s inquiry into the “composi- 
tionality” of a recorded element to litigants’ burdens in seeking to 
admit, or preclude, that element as evidence of substantial similarity 
among compositions. 
 
  
2020] FRE-BIRD 1313 
 
A DAY IN THE LIFE: INTRODUCTION ................................... 1315 
I. BORDERLINE: THE HISTORICAL CONVERGENCE OF 
COMPOSITION AND SOUND RECORDING ............. 1319 
A. Before Recorded Music ................................ 1321 
B. Tin Pan Alley ................................................ 1323 
C. The Commingling of Songwriter, Producer, and 
Artist Roles ................................................... 1324 
D. The Merging of Composition and Production
 1326 
E. The Evolution of Songwriter Splits .............. 1328 
F. Sampling ....................................................... 1331 
II. FORMATION: THE JUDICIAL COLLISION OF 
COMPOSITION AND SOUND RECORDING ............. 1333 
A. Judicial Conceptions of “Composition” ...... 1333 
1. Compositions v. Recordings .................. 1334 
2. Modern Doctrine ................................... 1335 
3. Protectable, Unprotectable, or 
“Constellation” ...................................... 1336 
B. Scope of Protection ...................................... 1338 
1. Pre-1978 and Post-1978 Copyright Office 
Regulation ............................................. 1338 
2. The Deposit Copy Question .................. 1340 
3. Creators’ Consensus .............................. 1341 
C. Infringement Proceedings ............................ 1341 
1. Substantial Similarity ............................ 1342 
2. “Filtering Out” ....................................... 1343 
3. Evidentiary Backdrop ............................ 1344 
D. Recent Proceedings Featuring Sound Recording 
Rulings ......................................................... 1345 
1. Blurred Lines ......................................... 1346 
2. Stairway to Heaven ............................... 1348 
3. Thinking Out Loud ................................ 1352 
III. STICKSHIFTS AND SAFETYBELTS: POLICY PROS AND 
CONS .................................................................. 1354 
A. Pros and Cons of an Expanded Definition of 
“Composition” ............................................. 1355 
1. Cons: Arguments for the Traditional 
Definition of “Composition” ................. 1355 
1314       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:1311 
 
a) The Expanded Definition Defies 
Prevailing Industry Understanding 
and Preference ........................... 1356 
b) Broader Protection Risks Extending 
Copyright to Ideas, Rather Than 
Expression of those Ideas .......... 1358 
c) There is a Fundamental Difference 
Between Composition and 
Performance............................... 1358 
d) A Narrower Definition Is Simply 
More Manageable ...................... 1360 
2. Pros: Arguments for an Expanded Definition 
of “Composition” .................................. 1361 
a) A Broader Definition Promotes 
Fairness ...................................... 1361 
b) Greater Accessibility of Songwriter 
Credit ......................................... 1362 
c) Rightsholders Can License Around 
the New Reality ......................... 1363 
B. Pros and Cons of Unrestricted Sound Recording 
Use in Composition Infringement Trials ...... 1364 
1. Pros: Arguments for the Unrestricted Use of 
Sound Recordings in Composition 
Infringement Trials ................................ 1365 
a) Unrestricted Sound Recording  
Use Reflects Evolving Creative 
Practices..................................... 1365 
b) The Limitations and Drawbacks of 
Written Reductions .................... 1366 
c) Expert Methodology .................. 1368 
d) Using Sound Recordings Is Just 
Simpler ...................................... 1369 
2. Cons: Arguments for More Restricted Use of 
Sound Recordings in Composition 
Infringement Trials ................................ 1371 
a) Practical Difficulties .................. 1371 
b) Jury Confusion .......................... 1372 
c) Jury Manipulation...................... 1373 
IV. THE WAY YOU MOVE: INTRODUCING THE “TRIAD” 
2020] FRE-BIRD 1315 
 
APPROACH ......................................................... 1374 
A. Triad Step One: “Compositionality”  
Spectrum ....................................................... 1376 
B. Triad Steps Two and Three: Probative v. 
Prejudicial Burdens ..................................... 1379 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1381 
 
A DAY IN THE LIFE: INTRODUCTION 
There was a moment when Robin Thicke and Pharrell  
Williams were clearly going to win. Amid the torrent of popular and 
scholarly writing debating the Blurred Lines verdict1 and  
its survival in the Ninth Circuit,2 that moment has been largely muf-
fled by the din surrounding the reality that Thicke and Williams (the 
“Thicke Parties”) did not, in fact, win. But the moment existed, and 
for that forgotten snapshot in time, their adversaries were doomed. 
In what was described as a “huge victory”3—an “unblurred vic-
tory”4—for the Thicke Parties, with “devastating consequences”5 
for the Marvin Gaye estate, the district court ruled that the commer-
cially released sound recording of “Got to Give It Up” by Marvin 
 
1 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 
4479500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v. 
Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Williams v. 
Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018). The jury found Thicke and Williams, but not co-
writer/rapper Clifford Harris a/k/a T.I., liable for infringement. Id. The district court 
overruled the jury’s finding of no liability for T.I. Id. 
2 Williams, 895 F.3d at 1116 (primarily affirming on “narrow grounds” the district 
court’s ruling, while reversing the district court’s decision to override the jury’s verdict in 
favor of T.I.). 
3 Marvin Gaye ‘Got to Give It Up’ Recording Barred From ‘Blurred Lines’ Trial, 
ABC7 (Jan. 27, 2015), https://abc7.com/entertainment/marvin-gaye-got-to-give-it-up-
recording-barred-from-blurred-lines-trial/492597/ [https://perma.cc/R6RW-QMHV]. 
4 Nancy Dillon, Marvin Gaye’s ‘Got to Give It Up’ Will Not Be Played For Jurors 
During ‘Blurred Lines’ Copyright Trial, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 27, 2015, 1:45 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/music/jurors-not-hear-marvin-gaye-song-
blurred-lines-trial-article-1.2093741 [https://perma.cc/4GDZ-AV45]. 
5 Eriq Gardner, Marvin Gaye Family Seeks ‘Blurred Lines’ Appeal, Warns of 
“Devastating Consequences” of Key Ruling (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 29, 
2015, 3:15 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/marvin-gaye-family-seeks-
blurred-768223 [https://perma.cc/J6EJ-HFSV]. 
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Gaye could not be played for the jury whose role it would be to  
determine whether the Thicke Parties’ 2013 number one hit 
“Blurred Lines” had infringed Gaye’s 1977 masterpiece.6 For an in-
fringement claim less grounded in melodic and lyrical similarities, 
and more reliant on the kind of “stylistic similarities” native to the 
recording, and not reflected in the sheet music, this really mattered.7 
Without hearing the recording, jurors would not be allowed to con-
sider the many performance, production, and arrangement elements 
that made the two records sound so alike. 
The Gaye estate scrambled together an interlocutory appeal8 of 
the ruling: “[We] do not believe that a truly fair trial can take place 
if the jury cannot hear and compare both songs.”9 The district court 
denied the motion.10 At that point, victory for the Thicke Parties was 
all but assured—per conventional wisdom, anyway. 
In fact, the court had already subtly walked back its ban of the 
“Got to Give It Up” commercial recording. Its revised ruling  
allowed “edited sound recordings” in which certain elements had 
been digitally removed.11 Less than two months later, twelve jurors 
who had never heard—in court, at least—the commercial version of 
“Got to Give It Up,” found the Thicke Parties liable for  
infringement.12 A few years later, the Ninth Circuit upheld the  
jury’s findings.13 
 
6 Final Pretrial Conference at 1, Williams v. Bridgeport Music Inc., No. 2:13–CV–
06004 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), ECF No. 226. 
7 See Allen Madison & Paul Lombardi, Blurred Justice, 39 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 145, 
193 (2019); Jennifer Jenkins, The “Blurred Lines” of Law, CTR. FOR STUDY PUB. DOMAIN, 
https://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/blurredlines/ [https://perma.cc/SY8Z-KX3T]. 
8 Counter-Claimaints’ Ex Parte Application for Continuance of Trial, Reconsideration 
of Granting Motion in Limine No. 1–3 and Certification of Question for Interlocutory 
Appeal, Williams v. Bridgeport Music Inc., No. 2:13–CV–06004 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 
2013), ECF. No. 232. 
9 Dillon, supra note 4. 
10 See (In Chambers) Order Re Defendants’ Ex Parte Application for Continuance of 
Trial, Reconsideration of Granting Motion in Limine No. 1–3 and Certification of Question 
for Interlocutory Appeal, Williams v. Bridgeport Music Inc., No. 2:13–CV–06004 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), ECF No. 251. 
11 Id. 
12 Williams, 2015 WL 4479500, at *1. 
13 Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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Over the past half-decade, music industry rhetoric surrounding 
copyright infringement litigation has intensified.14 That heightened 
pitch can largely be traced to March 10, 2015, the date of the Blurred 
Lines verdict.15 It has not subsided: similarly controversial decisions 
have been rendered in infringement proceedings involving hits by 
Led Zeppelin16 and Katy Perry,17 in the wake of a seemingly ever-
swelling deluge of infringement complaints.18 
 
14 See, e.g., Ben Sisario, ‘Blurred Lines’ Lawyer Rocks Music Industry Again, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/business/media/blurred-
lines-lawyer-rocks-music-industry-again.html [https://perma.cc/XGQ4-R37U]. 
15 See id.; Eriq Gardner, ‘Blurred Lines’ Trial Verdict: Jury Rules Against Pharrell 
Williams & Robin Thicke, BILLBOARD (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/news/6495159/blurred-lines-trial-verdict [https://perma.cc/3L2L-X2C6]; see also 
Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1865 (2018) (“It’s 
tough to overstate the amount of controversy that the case has generated.”). “Blurred Lines” 
has garnered controversy along multiple fronts. For discussion of the song’s lyrical sex and 
consent issues, see Pharrell Says He’s Embarrassed by “Blurred Lines,” GQ (Oct. 14, 
2019), https://www.gq.com/story/pharrell-embarrassed-by-blurred-lines [https://perma.cc/
U92F-EALR]; Elizabeth Plank, Robin Thicke’s Sexism Isn’t “Blurry,” SALON (July 27, 
2013), https://www.salon.com/2013/07/27/blurred_lines_is_clearly_sexist_partner/ 
[https://perma.cc/XS8D-9HUX]; Julie Beck, When Pop Culture Sells Dangerous Myths 
About Romance, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/
archive/2018/01/when-pop-culture-sells-dangerous-myths-about-romance/549749/ 
[https://perma.cc/36MN-HWNR]. 
16 See Stairway to Court: US Judges Order New Led Zeppelin Plagiarism Trial, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2018, 9:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/sep/28/
led-zeppelin-plagiarism-taurus-spirit-stairway-to-heaven-new-trial [https://perma.cc/
M4LQ-SML6]; see also Daniel Sanchez, 123 Artists File an Amicus Brief in Led 
Zeppelin’s Closely Watched ‘Stairway to Heaven’ Lawsuit, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Aug. 2, 
2019), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2019/08/02/led-zeppelin-amicus-brief/ (non-
archivable website); Jon Blistein, A New Led Zeppelin Court Win Over ‘Stairway to 
Heaven’ Just Upended a Copyright Precedent, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 9, 2020, 3:45 PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/led-zeppelin-stairway-to-heaven-
copyright-infringement-ruling-appeal-964530/ [https://perma.cc/5DF7-TDJ7]. 
17 See, e.g., Jem Aswad, Katy Perry and Co-Writers Call ‘Dark Horse’ Decision a 
‘Travesty of Justice’, VARIETY (Aug. 2, 2019), https://variety.com/2019/music/news/katy-
perry-and-co-writers-call-dark-horse-decision-a-travesty-of-justice-1203290191/ 
[https://perma.cc/F37V-SWKV]; Eriq Gardner, Judge Wipes Out $2.8M Copyright Verdict 
against Katy Perry, Capitol Records, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 17, 2020, 4:26 PM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judge-wipes-28m-copyright-verdict-katy-
perry-capitol-records-1285141 [https://perma.cc/5JAB-XX8F]. 
18 See Music Copyright Infringement Resource, GW LAW BLOGS, https://blogs.
law.gwu.edu/mcir/cases/ [https://perma.cc/B2SU-JHX5]; Bill Donahue, 2016: The Year 
the Music Sued, LAW360 (Jan. 13, 2017, 5:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
880127/2016-the-year-the-music-sued [https://perma.cc/5JGF-TLUD]. Some have 
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Lurking beneath disagreements on the merits of each case are a 
number of ongoing larger, even existential, debates that strike at the 
underlying purposes of copyright, the legal identity of the musical 
“composition,” and the proper methods by which such works ought 
to be dissected in court. These discussions are not new. Yet, the spe-
cific procedural and substantive postures of recent high-profile cases 
have triggered a glut in both popular and scholarly discussion sur-
rounding the eminently technical idiosyncrasies of music copyright 
litigation.19 
This Note seeks to distill from that glut a seemingly simple ques-
tion: how should courts approach the use of sound recordings in 
composition infringement trials? The simplicity of this framing is 
misleading, however. It is impossible to adequately answer this 
question without confronting another: how can one determine what 
is a probative (or misleading) representation of a musical composi-
tion without first defining the border between composition and  
recording? Accordingly, this Note outlines the various creative, in-
dustry, and public policy nuances that affect these two inseparable 
inquiries. 
Seeking to best navigate these complexities, this Note’s  
proposed Triad approach explicitly acknowledges the symbiosis be-
tween the formal “composition” doctrinal discussion and the func-
tional evidentiary debate, and purposefully marries the two. It forges 
a middle-ground compromise that respects songwriters’ narrow, 
consensus view of what constitutes a composition, while also heed-
ing the increased blurriness between composition and recording. 
The proposed three-step Triad approach begins with a judicial in-
quiry into (1) the “compositionality” of a recorded element  
offered into evidence. It proposes a suite of non-dispositive factors 
to guide the compositionality inquiry, and then leverages that  
 
speculated that the flood will subside in the wake of the recent prominent and defendant-
friendly Led Zeppelin and Katy Perry outcomes. See Ben Sisario, The ‘Blurred Lines’ Case 
Scared Songwriters. But Its Time May Be Up., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/arts/music/blurred-lines-led-zeppelin-
copyright.html [https://perma.cc/ZPF7-ZZGM]; see also Jonathan Bailey, Burying Blurred 
Lines, PLAGIARISMTODAY (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2020/04/07/
burying-blurred-lines/ [https://perma.cc/K2HW-UAZF]. 
19 See, e.g., infra notes 238, 264, 274 and accompanying text. 
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finding to allocate the burden for (2) introducing or (3) precluding  
recorded elements embodying the material in question. 
This Note does not evaluate whether specific cases were rightly 
or wrongly decided, nor does it apply doctrine to ongoing proceed-
ings in an effort to predict or promote an outcome based on any in-
terpretation of the law as it exists today. Rather, this Note adopts a 
history- and policy-driven search for clarity: how can courts  
balance creative and industry perspectives with evolving realities in 
order to facilitate future creativity and promote consistent,  
predictable justice? 
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I explores the history 
of the two music copyrights (composition and sound recording), the 
creative practices they promote, and their gradual convergence 
along both creative and business dimensions. Part II examines  
how this convergence has been reflected in the courts. Building 
upon this historical background, Part III articulates the policy impli-
cations surrounding different approaches to defining musical com-
positions and the use of sound recordings in infringement proceed-
ings involving those compositions. Finally, Part IV shepherds these 
historical and policy complexities into a judicial approach that  
allows courts the stability and flexibility to best promote both judi-
cial and creative clarity. 
I. BORDERLINE: THE HISTORICAL CONVERGENCE OF 
COMPOSITION AND SOUND RECORDING 
Musical compositions and sound recordings form two discrete 
pieces of intellectual property. Any single composition may be em-
bodied in an infinite number of separate sound recordings. To illus-
trate, the composition “Yesterday,” written by Paul McCartney and 
John Lennon, has been recorded thousands of times.20 Each of those 
sound recordings constitutes a separate piece of intellectual property 
(e.g., “Yesterday” as recorded by Gladys Knight & The Pips,  
or “Yesterday” as recorded by Marvin Gaye, or “Yesterday” as 
 
20 Most Recorded Song, GUINNESS WORLD RECORDS, https://web.archive.org/web/
20060910071729/http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/content_pages/record.asp?recor
did=50867 [https://perma.cc/VFA4-ADT9]. 
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recorded by The Beatles). But each separate recording embodies the 
same single composition: the song “Yesterday,” as written by Paul 
McCartney and John Lennon.21 
The delineation between these two basic widgets of musical cre-
ativity is foundational to the modern music industry. Fundamentally, 
the sound recording and composition copyrights comprise two 
wholly distinct intellectual assets, governed by distinct regulatory 
schemes, judicial doctrines, and industry infrastructures.22 While 
federal copyright law in the United States has provided for the  
protection of musical compositions since 1831,23 Congress did not 
extend copyright protection to sound recordings until 1972—nearly 
a hundred years after Thomas Edison first secured a patent for the 
invention of the phonograph.24 This sound recording copyright is 
bound by the literal performance as actually reflected on the record-
ing, and is endowed in the performers of the music.25 Meanwhile, 
the composition copyright applies to the underlying piece of song-
writing and is endowed in the authors of the song.26 The rights of 
one do not extend to the other.27 
 
21 Yesterday, ASCAP: ACE REPERTORY, https://www.ascap.com/repertory#ace/search/
workID/550055368 [https://perma.cc/34HW-DN7C]. 
22 See T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1576 n.1 (D.N.J. 1987). 
23 Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436–38; see also Lydia Pallas Loren, 
Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 679 (2003). 
24 See History of the Cylinder Phonograph, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.
gov/collections/edison-company-motion-pictures-and-sound-recordings/articles-and-
essays/history-of-edison-sound-recordings/history-of-the-cylinder-phonograph/ 
[https://perma.cc/XVD4-2SL5]; see also Loren, supra note 23, at 686 (“This new layer of 
copyright protection is separate from the protection granted to any musical work that may 
also be reproduced in a sound recording. The sound recording copyright protects the 
elements of original authorship that inhere in a sound recording, whether it is a recording 
of a musical performance, the reading of a book, or the sounds of railroad whistles.”). 
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012) (extending sound recording protection to “the actual 
sounds fixed in the recording”). Courts have interpreted this to preclude any authorized 
taking of any portion of the sound recording. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films, 410 F.3d 792, 800 (6th Cir. 2005); 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10 
(2019). 
26 See Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music 
Composition Copyright Infringement, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 146 (2011); 
Fishman, supra note 15, at 1884. 
27 See Lucille M. Ponte, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling 
Infringement Cases Are Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the Need 
for Statutory Reform, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 524 (2006). 
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In practice, the precise border separating the two copyrights can 
be significantly blurrier than this simple overview might suggest. To 
be sure, the bounds of the recording copyright are easy enough to 
define: only literal sounds taken from the actual recording are pro-
tected.28 Even the most convincing sonic mimicry does not infringe 
a sound recording copyright.29 By stark contrast, however, the 
bounds of the composition are not nearly so conspicuous. This am-
biguity, along with its doctrinal and practical significance, will be 
explored in depth beginning in Part II of this Note. 
First, though, in order to understand contemporary confusion 
around the role sound recordings play in defining the compositions 
they embody and why that issue is crescendoing today, it is impera-
tive to track the separate—but increasingly overlapping—history of 
both forms of musical creativity. Accordingly, Part I of this Note 
traces the historical origins of the foundational dichotomy between 
composition and sound recording. Part I.A focuses on the era before 
the invention and widespread adoption of recorded music. Part I.B 
discusses the rise of recorded music and the initial separation of the 
music industry’s compositional and recording silos. Parts I.C and 
I.D document two modern creative developments that have signifi-
cantly obscured the boundaries between composition and sound  
recording: the commingling of individual creative roles, and the 
merging of the creative processes associated with composition and 
production. Finally, Parts I.E and I.F explore two business practices 
that inform the industry’s own conception of the composition:  
modern songwriter share allocation and the rise of sampling. 
A. Before Recorded Music 
The tidy formal border between sound recordings and the com-
positions they embody derives directly from the real-world creative 
delineations that existed throughout most of the first century of U.S. 
copyright governance.30 For most of that period, spanning from the 
 
28 See Melissa Eckhause, Digital Sampling v. Appropriation Art: Why Is One Stealing 
and the Other Fair Use? A Proposal for A Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Digital 
Music Sampling, 84 MO. L. REV. 371, 400 (2019). 
29 See id.; Joanna Demers, Sound-Alikes, Law, and Style, 83 UMKC L. REV. 303 (2014). 
30 Robert Brauneis, Musical Work Copyright for the Era of Digital Sound Technology: 
Looking Beyond Composition and Performance, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2–3 
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original Copyright Act of 179031 through the nineteenth century, 
recorded music did not exist.32 Musical works were authored  
by composers and notated visually for use by performers.33 The 
dominant commercial format was sheet music, which conveyed 
notes, rhythms, lyrics, and other stylistic cues to the performer.34 
The Copyright Act of 1831,35 the first to extend protection to  
musical compositions, reflected this relatively simple creative and 
industry configuration.36 
Contemporary conceptions of the composition placed particular 
emphasis on melody, as notated in the sheet music. This “outsized 
importance” of melody in Western musical culture stemmed from 
compositional norms of the pre-record era.37 At that time, “[t]he 
usual compositional process was first to create music at the piano 
and then subsequently orchestrate it.”38 The resulting cultural “sub-
ordination of timbre to pitch” would survive centuries of creative 
and industry upheaval.39 
 
(2014) (characterizing the first “150 years” of United States copyright law as construing 
music as a “two-stage art of [protected] composition and [unprotected] performance.”). 
“Composition—a deliberative activity that allowed rethinking and editing—produced a 
score, a stable, visually perceptible representation of melody, harmony, and rhythm that 
used a system of mostly discrete notation.” Id. Performance, then, constituted a “real-time, 
low-deliberation, no-editing activity that was evanescent, unrepeatable, purely aural, and 
continuous.” Id. 
31 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124–26. 
32 See Loren, supra note 23, at 686. 
33 See id. at 679. 
34 See Peter Lee, Reconceptualizing the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Shaping 
Industry Structure, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1248 (2019). Initially, even after the rise of 
recorded music, the preeminence of sheet music continued. See Charles Cronin, Seeing Is 
Believing: The Ongoing Significance of Symbolic Representations of Musical Works in 
Copyright Infringement Disputes, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. 225, 226 (2018). 
35 Copyright Act of 1897, ch. 392, 29 Stat. 694. 
36 See Loren, supra note 23, at 679–81 (observing that the Act did not grant authors 
exclusive reproduction or public performance rights; it merely afforded them protection 
against unauthorized copying of their written reductions). 
37 Fishman, supra note 15, at 1875–77 (tracking the ways in which, historically, 
“[melody’s] primacy begot property.”). 
38 Id. at 1875. 
39 Id. at 1875–77 (outlining a “dichotomy that continues to influence music copyright 
today: those who create new melodies are artists, while those who recontextualize those 
melodies are mere craftsmen.”). 
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In the early twentieth century, new means of reproducing and 
distributing musical works emerged. First came self-playing piano 
rolls, whose advent triggered a reckoning of federal licensing laws; 
the Copyright Act of 190940 again positioned the composition as 
equivalent to the written score.41 Although piano rolls would quickly 
become the first of many formerly prominent, effectively obsolete 
twentieth-century music technologies, copyright law’s fixation on 
the written score would continue to govern a new non-written  
format: recorded music. 
B. Tin Pan Alley 
Neither piano rolls, nor the first half-century of recorded music 
did much to change the incumbent separation of the composition and 
performance processes. For much of the twentieth century, compo-
sition was understood to be a thoroughly self-contained exercise. As 
a rule, the popular music supply chain featured a songwriting pro-
cess whose entire life cycle began and ended prior to the perfor-
mance/recording stage.42 This model was typified by the “Tin Pan 
Alley” machine, wherein music publishers would employ compos-
ers and lyricists to create what were understood to be fully formed 
compositions, and “song pluggers” to place those compositions with 
popular recording artists and performers.43 Even as these stark  
 
40 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–88. 
41 See White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 11 (1908); Brauneis, 
supra note 30, at 13 (“[White-Smith] reaffirmed the centrality of the score.”). In response 
to White-Smith, Congress promptly endowed to rightsholders the exclusive right to 
mechanical reproduction of media such as piano rolls or records. See id. Still, the Copyright 
Act of 1909 only contemplated protection via “publication of visually perceptible copies 
of that composition” or by “registration accompanied by deposit of a visually perceptible 
copy.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 
1128808, at *6 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2020) (“Although the 1909 Act extended copyright 
protection against infringement beyond the mere reproduction of the sheet music, Congress 
did not provide that copyrighted works could be anything other than sheet music or, for an 
unpublished work, the musical composition transcribed in the deposit copy.”). 
42 See Shourin Sen, The Denial of A General Performance Right in Sound Recordings: 
A Policy That Facilitates Our Democratic Civil Society?, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 246 
(2007); see also America’s Music Publishing Industry: The Story of Tin Pan Alley,  
PARLOR SONGS ACADEMY, http://parlorsongs.com/insearch/tinpanalley/tinpanalley.php 
[https://perma.cc/3SGZ-8R3A]. 
43 See, e.g., Sen supra note 42, at 246. For additional context on music publishing, see 
Shalini Sutharshana, A Brief History of Music Publishing, SONGTRUST (Apr. 3, 2018), 
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dividing lines began to fade,44 iterations of this model remained  
successful through the 1960s. Berry Gordy’s Motown enterprise  
employed what Gordy considered an “assembly line for music,”45 
where “[a]rtists performed, writers wrote, producers produced,”  
instrumentalists played their instruments, pluggers plugged, and  
so on.46 
Thus, for the first half-century of marketed recorded music, the 
predominant supply chain for the production of music was linear: 
(1) composition (as conceived at the time: melody, harmony and lyr-
ics) as a self-contained process; and (2) production, arrangement, 
and performance. As a result, defining the scope of a composition 
was simple: it was nothing more and nothing less than what the com-
poser(s) had created during step one. 
C. The Commingling of Songwriter, Producer, and Artist Roles 
After centuries of siloed compositional and performance roles, 
the walls started to crumble fairly quickly in the 1960s.47 Suddenly, 
many of the decade’s most successful artists were penning their own 
hits, including musicians as varied as Bob Dylan, Otis Redding, 
Joan Baez, Paul Simon, Joni Mitchell, Dolly Parton, and Aretha 
 
https://blog.songtrust.com/brief-history-of-the-music-publishing [https://perma.cc/A6Q9-
7YJM]. 
44 See infra Part I.C. 
45 See Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: Motown—a Pop Factory with Quality 
Control, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2010, 11:59 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/
musicblog/2010/nov/26/behind-music-motown-pop-factory [https://perma.cc/FW8Q-
8L9V]. 
46 See Vince Carducci, Manufacturing Motown, POPMATTERS (Jan. 26, 2009), 
https://www.popmatters.com/69384-manufacturing-motown-2496071565.html 
[https://perma.cc/PF6E-ZXC5] (quoting Temptations leader Otis Williams). 
47 There were exceptions. See, e.g., Christopher Reynolds, Documenting the Zenith of 
Women Song Composers: A Database of Songs Published in the United States and the 
British Commonwealth, CA. 1890–1930, 69 NOTES 671, 675 (2013) (documenting early 
20th century women songwriters, including some who were also performers, such as Bessie 
Smith); Ted Ownby, Jimmie Rodgers: The Father of Country Music, MISSISSIPPI HISTORY 
NOW (July 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20101007161643/http://mshistory.
k12.ms.us/articles/39/jimmie-rodgers-the-father-of-country-music 
[https://perma.cc/AX58-QHP4]; Duke Ellington: The Composer, Pt. 1, NPR (Nov. 19, 
2018, 10:16 AM), https://www.npr.org/2008/11/19/97193567/duke-ellington-the-
composer-pt-1 [https://perma.cc/CT99-DKJA]. 
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Franklin.48 This was mirrored by the emergence of rock bands, such 
as The Beatles and The Rolling Stones, who played their own in-
struments and sang songs composed by group members.49 Mean-
while, Tin Pan Alley songwriters like Carole King and Neil Dia-
mond became mainstream recording artists.50 By the end of the 
1960s, even the rigid divisions at Motown began to dissolve: artists 
whose talents extended beyond performance started to assert them-
selves as writers and producers.51 Chief among those artists were 
Stevie Wonder and, significantly, Marvin Gaye.52 
Also noteworthy was the convergence of the songwriting and 
producing roles. As the purview of the record producer expanded 
beyond its original bundle of talent scouting, business development, 
and logistical responsibilities53 into a more influential creative posi-
tion,54 it became more common for songwriters—including Ray 
 
48 History: The Singer/Songwriter, BMI, https://www.bmi.com/genres/entry/history_
the_singer_songwriter [https://perma.cc/55XN-EGGH]. 
49 It was not normal when they started. See DAVID SHEFF, ALL WE ARE SAYING: THE 
LAST MAJOR INTERVIEW WITH JOHN LENNON AND YOKO ONO 171 (St. Martin’s Griffin 1st 
ed. 2000) (“Paul and I just went off in the corner of the room and finished [writing ‘I Wanna 
Be Your Man’] while [members of the Rolling Stones, who would soon record the song] 
were all still there talking. We came back and that’s how Mick and Keith got inspired to 
write, because, ‘Jesus, look at that. They just went in the corner and wrote it and came 
back!’”). 
50 The “Brill Building Sound” Shaped Pop and Rock and Roll in the 60’s, MUSIC 
ORIGINS PROJECT, https://www.musicorigins.org/item/the-brill-building-sound-shaped-
pop-and-rock-and-roll-in-the-60s/ [https://perma.cc/L7LT-DEAH]. 
51 See Francesca D’Amico, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, But It Will Be 
Recorded: Soul, Funk, and the Black Urban Experience, 1968–1979, in THE GLOBAL 
SIXTIES IN SOUND AND VISION: MEDIA, COUNTERCULTURE, REVOLT 188 (T. Brown & A. 
Lison eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2014). 
52 See Charles Moss, What’s Going On: Marvin Gaye’s Liberation from the Motown 
Sound, POPMATTERS (Jan. 28, 2009), https://www.popmatters.com/69381-whats-going-
on-marvin-gayes-liberation-from-the-motown-sound-2496071599.html 
[https://perma.cc/7R2L-6M8V]; Chris Williams, ‘I Thought He Was a Messenger’: 
Making Stevie Wonder’s ‘Talking Book,’ ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2012), https://www.the
atlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/10/i-thought-he-was-a-messenger-making-
stevie-wonders-talking-book/264182 [https://perma.cc/J79P-T3FC]. 
53 See Greg Kot, What Does a Record Producer Do?, BBC (Mar. 10, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20160310-what-does-a-record-producer-do 
[https://perma.cc/QJ4A-F3AR]. 
54 See Randall Roberts, How George Martin’s Studio Tricks and Innovations Changed 
Pop Music, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016, 1:41 PM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/
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Davies of The Kinks,55 Brian Wilson of The Beach Boys,56 and Nor-
man Whitfield, Holland-Dozier-Holland, and Smokey Robinson of 
Motown57—to serve in this capacity. 
D. The Merging of Composition and Production 
It may have been inevitable, once the barrier between composers 
and performers eroded, that the neat delineation between composi-
tion and performance/production would soon follow. Relatively 
early examples of the convergence of composition and recording  
efforts include works such as “Birthday” by The Beatles,58 “Under 
Pressure” by Queen and David Bowie,59 and much of the album Re-
main in Light by the Talking Heads,60 which were all composed at 
least in part during the recording process. Decades before the rise of 
modern sampling,61 Brian Wilson experimented with recording nu-
merous “brief musical passages” and stitching them together into 
new compositions.62 In one doctrinally consequential example, 
 
music/posts/la-et-ms-how-george-martin-studio-tricks-beatles-changed-pop-music-
20160309-story.html [https://perma.cc/BR35-MTPA]. 
55 See Matt Frost, Ray Davies: Five Decades in the Studio, SOUND ON SOUND, 
https://www.soundonsound.com/people/ray-davies [https://perma.cc/S4X7-KRE9] 
(discussing, with Davies himself, how the “ups and downs [arising] when a musician and 
principal songwriter begins to move from being produced to being producer” interweaved 
with his actual compositional process). 
56 See Carl Wilson, The Beach Boys’ Brian Wilson: America’s Mozart?, BBC (June 9, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20150608-is-this-americas-mozart [https://
perma.cc/5H42-BSCR]. 
57 Rashad Grove, Got to Give it Up: 15 Songwriters and Producers That Shaped the 
Motown Sound, UDISCOVERMUSIC (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.udiscovermusic.com/
stories/motown-sound-producers-and-songwriters [https://perma.cc/376T-W37U]. 
58 The White Album, BEATLES ULTIMATE EXPERIENCE, http://www.beatlesinterviews.
org/dba09white.html [https://perma.cc/Y4JN-8S3G]. 
59 See Josh Jones, The Making of Queen and David Bowie’s 1981 Hit “Under 
Pressure”: Demos, Studio Sessions & More, OPEN CULTURE (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.openculture.com/2014/06/the-making-of-under-pressure.html 
[https://perma.cc/R8SQ-A8K2]. 
60 See Dave Simons, The Song or the Studio: Which Comes First?, BMI (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.bmi.com/news/entry/the-song-or-the-studio-which-comes-first 
[https://perma.cc/NUR7-L82R]. 
61 See infra Part I.F. 
62 See Simons, supra note 60. 
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George Clinton composed his allegedly infringed hit “Atomic Dog” 
as he recorded it.63 
This was a harbinger of norms to come. While the linear com-
position-then-recording supply chain of yore is not wholly extinct,64 
modern pop music is dominated by a digital creative process that 
merges composition with production.65 Digital recording technol-
ogy has allowed for more democratized creation: it has become 
common practice for producers to source arrangement and produc-
tion elements from multiple collaborators through the sharing of 
digital recording session files with other creators, including lyric and 
melody writers (“topliners”), as well as other producers.66 
Directly contrary to the traditional configuration, today “[i]n 
commercial songwriting, the track virtually always comes first.”67 
Often, producers will send out the same backing track68 to several 
topliners, who then submit what are essentially competing melodic 
 
63 See Brief of Defendants–Appellants at 29, Bridgeport Music v. Smelzgood Entm’t, 
No. 07–5596, 2007 WL 5066300 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2007). In a suit alleging infringement 
of “Atomic Dog” by the group Public Announcement, Clinton’s publisher would use this 
fact to (successfully) argue that composition and recording were equivalent. See infra notes 
110, 173 and accompanying text. 
64 It is still common in some genres, including modern country music. See, e.g., JOHN 
SEABROOK, THE SONG MACHINE: INSIDE THE HIT FACTORY 200 (2015) (observing the 
“spiritual” connection between Nashville and Tin Pan Alley). 
65 See Brauneis, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that in modern music creation, “the roles 
of composer, musician, and producer are blurred as composition, performance, recording, 
synthesizing, sequencing, sampling, editing, processing, and mixing are accomplished 
iteratively and collaboratively,” and thus written reductions are “only approximations of 
the recorded works.”). 
66 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice 
Musician and Composers and Law, Music, and Business Professors in Support of 
Appellees at 36, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) (arguing that modern 
music creators birth compositions that are “purely aural and digital” such that “paper sheet 
music notation itself is becoming an archaic, possibly obsolescent, format”). 
67 Benjamin Samama, What’s the Difference Between a Songwriter and a Topline 
Writer?, SONICBIDS BLOG (Mar. 2, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://blog.sonicbids.com/whats-the-
difference-between-a-songwriter-and-a-topline-writer [https://perma.cc/2TRB-6JF7]. 
68 The term “backing track” refers to a sound recording’s produced instrumental 
arrangement, which in western popular music typically accompanies the record’s lead 
vocal track. See Alex Needham, John Seabrook on The Song Machine: “There’s a Dark 
Side to Pop,” GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2011, 11:37 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
music/2015/nov/04/john-seabrook-song-machine-review-pop-music [https://perma.cc/
W59E-GSRQ]; Backing Track, COLLINS DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/
us/dictionary/english/backing-track [https://perma.cc/PE3R-AYWW]. 
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and lyrical bids to complete the same unfinished song.69 Instead of 
responding to pre-existing bundles of harmony, melody, and lyric, 
today’s arrangement and production elements predate, and therefore 
directly affect and inspire, the melodic and lyrical material that sits 
atop them.70 Experts have dubbed this reversal a change from the 
traditional “melody-and-lyrics” conception of songwriting, to the 
modern “track-and-hook” model.71 
E. The Evolution of Songwriter Splits 
The convergence of the composition and recording processes 
has spurred a shift in the predominant norms guiding the allocation 
of songwriter splits—the primary way in which the music industry 
defines compositional ownership and, by implication, the composi-
tion itself.72 Songwriter splits, or shares, refer to the percentage of 
 
69 See Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: Why Topline Melody Writing Creates 
Disputes Between Artists and Songwriters, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2011, 8:38 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2011/aug/26/topline-melody-disputes-
artists-songwriters [https://perma.cc/Z594-W74U] (discussing the complications arising 
from this practice). See also Needham, supra note 68 (reporting the “hot water” that 
producer/writer Ryan Tedder found himself in when Kelly Clarkson “noticed that the song 
he’d given her, Already Gone, was uncomfortably close to one he’d done with Beyoncé, 
Halo.”). 
70 Harmony is typically created as a part of the track production process, although 
topliners and melody can play a role in shaping harmony. See generally SEABROOK, supra 
note 64, at 189. 
71 See id. at 200 (“[Track-and-hook] has largely replaced the melody-and-lyrics 
approach to songwriting [from the] Tin Pan Alley era[] . . . . It is common practice for a 
producer to send the same track to multiple topliners—in extreme cases, as many as 50—
and choose the best melody from among the submissions.”). The term “hook,” in this 
context, broadly refers to a song’s primary vocal melodic material. See id. “Hook” is often 
also used to describe specific load-bearing chunks of melody that songwriters center their 
compositions around, such as a chorus or memorable repeated phrase. See Tom Cole, You 
Ask, We Answer: What’s A Hook?, NPR (Oct. 15, 2010, 6:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/therecord/2010/10/15/130588663/you-ask-we-answer-what-s-a-hook 
[https://perma.cc/N5AM-YD2H]. 
72 See Justin M. Jacobson, Are You Co-Writing Songs? A “Split Sheet” Just Isn’t 
Enough, HYPEBOT (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2015/11/why-a-
songwriter-split-sheet-just-isnt-enough-draft.html [https://perma.cc/6ZCT-SCHN]; 
Education, SONA, https://www.wearesona.com/education [https://perma.cc/C32K-
LGZ9]. 
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ownership allocated to each co-writer of a given musical work.73 
Ownership may be divided equally among co-writers,74 but relative 
adjustments may be made for a number of factors, including the ex-
tent of a co-writer’s contribution, a co-writer’s stature or seniority, 
or a co-writer’s leverage.75 While any of these or other factors may 
inform negotiations, there are no set rules governing share alloca-
tion. In reality, co-writers often do not even finalize shares until after 
the commercial release of the sound recording embodying their 
composition.76 
Traditionally, it was customary to allocate 50% to the creation 
of the lyrics and 50% to the creation of the accompanying music 
(melody, harmony, and rhythm).77 This convention reinforced the 
understanding that a composition was a self-contained bundle of 
words and melody. Two modern changes have complicated this 
practice. First, as the industry has largely shifted to a “Production + 
Topline” model,78 songwriter share norms have followed: typically, 
50% is now allocated to the creators of the backing track (generally 
producers and musicians, who arrange, record, and produce a  
recording’s instrumental bedrock) and 50% is allocated to “top-
 
73 See Helienne Lindvall, Calculating the Credits Behind Songwriting, GUARDIAN (June 
24, 2008, 6:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2008/jun/24/
calculatingthecreditsbehind [https://perma.cc/SZ8K-QYK3]. 
74 This is the statutory default. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2018). 
75 See Cottrill v. Spears, No. CIV.A. 02–3646, 2003 WL 21223846, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 
22, 2003), aff’d, 87 F. App’x 803 (3d Cir. 2004), as amended on reh’g (June 2, 2004); 
Theodora Michaels, Agree On Your Songwriter Splits, HEVEDBURG MUSIC, 
http://www.hevedburgmusic.com/article3.html [https://perma.cc/4GSU-EDNZ]; Patty 
Way, Co-Writing Nashville Style, ENVATO TUTS+ (Feb. 12, 2013), https://music.
tutsplus.com/articles/co-writing-nashville-style—audio-16388 [https://perma.cc/4V96-
63QV]. 
76 See ASCAP, Welcome to Splitsville, USA—Where Co-Writers Live Together in 
Harmony, YOUTUBE (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaFZ_
Q40qWk&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/XN54-AJXY]; Lindvall, supra note 73. 
77 See Richard Osborne, Doing the Splits: The Creative Accounting of Songwriting 
Shares, IASPM UK & IRELAND CONFERENCE 2016: CREATIVITY, PRACTICE AND PRAXIS, 
BRIGHTON 4–6 (2016) (noting that performing rights organization regulations codified this 
approach). 
78 See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
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liners” (writers of the melodic and lyrical material that sits atop the 
backing track).79 
Second, a broader coalition of music creators now enjoy access 
to songwriter shares than was once the case. Traditionally, instru-
mentalists and producers, operating from the perspective that a com-
position was a complete and self-contained work prior to the record-
ing process, would not typically have expected to attain songwriter 
credit.80 This model became ubiquitous through the emergence of 
rock bands that centered around songwriting partnerships like Len-
non/McCartney and Jagger/Richards.81 This “all-or-nothing” ap-
proach to rock songwriter credits once again reinforced the notion 
that composition was distinct from the arrangement, production, and 
performance of a piece. 
Today, instrumentalists, producers, and background vocalists 
who contribute creative ideas to the arrangement, production, and 
performance of a sound recording are much more likely to be cred-
ited as songwriters.82 Not coincidentally, the number of credited 
songwriters per pop hit has consistently, and dramatically, increased 
over the past several decades.83 While arguably reflecting a 
 
79 See Donna-Claire Chesman, Drew Love Pulls Back the Curtain on What It Means to 
Be a Songwriter in 2019, DJBOOTH (Apr. 16, 2019), https://djbooth.net/features/2019-
04-16-drew-love-interview-songwriting-royalty-exchange [https://perma.cc/H9P3-
NMYA]; Cliff Goldmacher, The Dos and Don’ts of Co-Writing, BMI (June 28, 2011), 
https://www.bmi.com/news/entry/the_dos_and_donts_of_co-writing 
[https://perma.cc/B9JR-WSC4]; Chris Robley, Should My Producer Get Publishing and 
Songwriting Credit?, DIY MUSICIAN (July 11, 2018), https://diymusician.cdbaby.com/
music-rights/does-my-producer-deserve-publishing-and-songwriting-credit 
[https://perma.cc/4PS4-XNQA]. 
80 See Mark Sutherland, Songwriting: Why It Takes More Than Two to Make a Hit 
Nowadays, MUSIC WEEK (May 16, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.musicweek.com/
publishing/read/songwriting-why-it-takes-more-than-two-to-make-a-hit-nowadays/
068478 [https://perma.cc/UL76-4PZP] (remarking that today’s producers and musicians 
are “more likely to be credited [as songwriters] for their contributions”). 
81 See Osborne, supra note 77, at 4–6. 
82 See Sutherland, supra note 80. 
83 See Dorian Lynskey, How Many People Does It Take to Write a Hit Song in 2019?, 
GQ (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/culture/article/long-songwriting-
credits [https://perma.cc/7HNS-8AU5] (enumerating several other factors that have also 
contributed to this trend); Dan Kopf, How Many People Take Credit for Writing a Hit 
Song?, PRICEONOMICS, https://priceonomics.com/how-many-people-take-credit-for-
writing-a-hit-song [https://perma.cc/ZE8F-5QEW]. 
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reasonable business reward for creative effort, these trends signifi-
cantly blur the distinction between compositional creativity and ar-
rangement, production, or performance creativity.84 
F. Sampling 
Another modern practice that has obscured the composition/re-
cording boundary is the rise of sampling.85 Typically, an artist or 
producer samples by incorporating a portion of a pre-existing sound 
recording into a new sound recording.86 Any given sample might 
encompass melodic and lyrical elements,87 or, commonly, “groove” 
elements such as a drum pattern.88 The borrowed material might per-
meate the majority of the new work,89 or it might be as fleeting as a 
baby’s coo.90 
 
84 Further blurring the lines between composition and recording is a practice that is 
wryly characterized by songwriters as “change a word, get a third.” Successful artists, 
leveraging songwriters’ willingness to barter an interest in their composition in exchange 
for securing a prominent placement, are often able to negotiate a songwriter credit even 
when they played no songwriting role. See Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: Credit 
Where Credit’s Due, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2008, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
music/musicblog/2008/jan/23/ivealwaysstudiedthecredits [https://perma.cc/9J7P-TS9S]. 
85 See generally Eckhause, supra note 28. 
86 Kevin Cornell, Music Sampling: Breaking Down the Basics, TUNECORE (Aug. 9, 
2016), https://www.tunecore.com/blog/2016/08/music-sampling-breaking-down-the-
basics.html [https://perma.cc/D6NM-25AF]. Here, “sampling” is defined as taking from a 
pre-existing sound recording, as distinct from the “interpolation” of a pre-existing 
composition without using any embodying recorded material. See What Is the Difference 
Between a Sample and Interpolation?, SONGTRUST, https://help.songtrust.com/knowledge/
what-is-the-difference-between-a-sample-and-interpolation [https://perma.cc/5EA7-
V793]. 
87 See, e.g., Kanye West Feat. Rihanna and Swizz Beatz’s ‘Famous’ Sample of Sister 
Nancy’s ‘Bam Bam’, WHOSAMPLED, https://www.whosampled.com/sample/408737/
Kanye-West-Rihanna-Swizz-Beatz-Famous-Sister-Nancy-Bam-Bam 
[https://perma.cc/HBL5-84H2]. 
88 See, e.g., Samples of When the Levee Breaks by Led Zeppelin, WHOSAMPLED, 
https://www.whosampled.com/Led-Zeppelin/When-the-Levee-Breaks/sampled 
[https://perma.cc/R2UF-PERY]. 
89 See, e.g., UGK Feat. OutKast’s ‘Int’l Players Anthem (I Choose You)’ Sample of 
Willie Hutch’s ‘I Choose You’, WHOSAMPLED, https://www.whosampled.com/
sample/1201/UGK-OutKast-Int%27l-Players-Anthem-(I-Choose-You)-Willie-Hutch-I-
Choose-You [https://perma.cc/85JQ-H3M8]. 
90 See, e.g., Aaliyah Feat. Timbaland’s ‘Are You That Somebody?’ Sample of Jac 
Holzman’s ‘Happy Baby’, WHOSAMPLED, https://www.whosampled.com/sample/313684/
Aaliyah-Timbaland-Are-You-That-Somebody%3F-Jac-Holzman-Happy-Baby 
[https://perma.cc/Y4B8-XU3E]. 
1332       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:1311 
 
Because recordings embody compositions, industry norms dic-
tate that sample licenses are sought for both the sampled recording 
and its underlying composition.91 Typically, the sample license for 
the composition might involve a flat fee, as well as songwriter 
credit.92 As a result, the new sound recording and its underlying 
composition become even more intertwined: the industry’s under-
standing of the new composition becomes defined, in part, by  
the pre-existing sound recording—regardless of the nature of the 
embedded compositional material taken along for the ride.93 
 
91 See Jamie Davis-Ponce, Borrowing Success: How to Legally Sample Music, 
SONICBIDS BLOG, http://blog.sonicbids.com/borrowing-success-how-to-legally-sample-
music [https://perma.cc/4QA8-R97X]; Music Sampling and Beat Licensing, TUNECORE, 
https://www.tunecore.com/guides/music-sampling-and-beat-licensing-101 
[https://perma.cc/Y7ZV-ZQFX]. While unlikely, it is technically possible to lawfully 
sample a recording without authorization from the compositional rightsholders. See 
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2004). An uncleared sample is an 
infringement of the sound recording copyright. See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner 
Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005). 
92 See Cornell, supra note 86. As is typically the case with songwriter splits, there are 
no hard and fast rules, but rather a fluid bargaining process. See id. 
93 Further complications may arise as the emerging retail markets for musical stems, 
beats, and sound libraries become more influential. See Unbundling the Song: Inside the 
Next Wave of Recorded Music’s Disruption, FORBES (May 13, 2018, 7:44 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cheriehu/2018/05/13/unbundling-the-song-inside-the-next-
wave-of-recorded-musics-disruption/#350689079cae [https://perma.cc/HB2M-C4XR]; 
Carmin Chappell, ‘Old Town Road’ is Now the Longest-Running No. 1 Song—and the Beat 
Lil Nas X Used Only Cost $30, CNBC (July 23, 2019, 2:40 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/07/23/lil-nas-x-bought-the-beat-used-in-old-town-road-for-30-on-beatstars.html 
[https://perma.cc/37E6-XHPQ]; Dani Deahl, Justin Bieber Was Accused of Stealing a 
Melody, But It’s Actually a Royalty-Free Sample You Can Buy Online, VERGE (Feb. 17, 
2020, 11:45 AM) https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/17/21140838/justin-bieber-changes-
running-over-asher-monroe-synergy-splice-sample-melody [https://perma.cc/UAV5-
DDND]; Jacob Goldstein, How to Make It in the Music Business, PLANET MONEY (Sept. 
15, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2017/09/15/551236508/episode-794-how-
to-make-it-in-the-music-business [https://perma.cc/KR7F-U2AX]. Incidentally, this 
shared sourcing of production material is just part of a general empirical trend towards 
sonic homogeneity in modern popular music. See, e.g., Chris Wickham, Pop Music Too 
Loud and All Sounds the Same: Official, REUTERS (July 26, 2012, 9:04 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-science-music/pop-music-too-loud-and-all-sounds-
the-same-official-idUSBRE86P0R820120726 [https://perma.cc/V7UR-V3MC]; Greg 
Milner, They Really Don’t Make Music Like They Used To, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/opinion/what-these-grammy-songs-tell-us-about-
the-loudness-wars.html [https://perma.cc/UN25-7GWN]. The sonic homogeneity trend, 
combined with judicial reliance upon recordings, could further stoke the substantial 
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II. FORMATION: THE JUDICIAL COLLISION OF COMPOSITION AND 
SOUND RECORDING 
Part II of this Note outlines how the creative and business  
developments discussed in Part I have filtered into the courtroom. 
Part II.A tracks evolving judicial understandings of the “composi-
tion.” Part II.B explores administrative variables affecting the scope 
of compositional copyright protection. Part II.C provides  
a structural overview of infringement proceedings and lays the  
evidentiary foundation for the sound recording-specific discussions 
at issue in this Note. Finally, Part II.D dissects recent composition 
infringement proceedings where sound recording rulings have  
taken center stage. 
A. Judicial Conceptions of “Composition” 
For much of American history, the legal definition of the musi-
cal composition was effectively limited to the work’s melody.94 This 
view permeated nineteenth-century case law.95 It followed, then, 
that a musical work could only infringe another when “to the ear of 
the average person the two melodies sound . . . the same.”96 While 
 
similarity flames. Still, as these headlines illustrate, there is a tendency for critics to 
overstate the homogeneity trend, and to conflate sonic and compositional homogeneity; 
there is separate, less stark, evidence of increasing pop compositional homogeneity. See, 
e.g., Andrew Thompson & Matt Daniels, The Musical Diversity of Pop Songs, PUDDING, 
https://pudding.cool/2018/05/similarity [https://perma.cc/V6MT-GF3U]. 
94 Id. at 1863; see also NIMMER, supra note 25, § 2.05[B] (“Melody is, of course, the 
usual source of protection for musical compositions.”); Margit Livingston & Joseph 
Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music: Determining Whether What Sounds Alike Is 
Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 227, 278 (2013) (“[M]elody [generally] drives the 
infringement bus.”). 
95 See Fishman, supra note 15, at 1869 (“Consciously or not, courts adopted the view of 
nineteenth-century European music theorists and critics who saw melody as a musical 
work’s aesthetic core.”); see, e.g., N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. 
Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (“It is the arrangement or succession of musical notes, 
which are the finger prints of the composition, and establish its identity.”); Jollie v. Jaques, 
13 F. Cas. 910, 913 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (contrasting the “genius” of melody creation with 
the “mechanic” nature of accompaniment). 
96 Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 877 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), aff’d, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1910) 
(emphasis added). 
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outlier cracks in this policy occasionally formed,97 the judicial fixa-
tion on melody persisted for many decades after the advent of rec-
orded music.98 Gradually, however, courts increasingly validated in-
fringement claims that extended beyond melody and into melody-
adjacent elements such as harmony and rhythm.99 This seemingly 
inconsequential shift presaged the modern blurring of the composi-
tion/recording dichotomy. 
1. Compositions v. Recordings 
Philosophically, a sound recording forms an uneasy bond with 
the composition it embodies; it is simultaneously a “terminal and 
canonical version of [the] composition” while also presenting, in 
fact, a “limited representation of [that] composition.”100 On the one 
hand, any single composition can be recorded, arranged, and 
adapted in an infinite number of ways.101 On the other, most com-
mercially successful compositions tend to be overwhelmingly  
associated with a single recording.102 
Functionally, recordings have provided countless more variables 
for would-be copiers to parrot. While nineteenth-century putative 
infringers were generally restricted to the limited confines  
of sheet music, modern proceedings typically involve putative  
infringers with access to widely disseminated, complex sound  
 
97 See, e.g., Fred Fisher, Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 145–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) 
(holding that a justiciable infringement claim could arise from a copying of the “‘ostinato,’ 
or constantly repeated figure” in the accompaniment alone). 
98 See, e.g., King, 105 F. Supp. at 400 (defending its focus on melody on the grounds 
that the possibilities among arrangement variables such as tempo, rhythm, and harmony 
had either “been long since exhausted” or had entered the public domain). 
99 See, e.g., Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (rejecting the assertion “that harmony can never be the subject of copyright” in a 
dispute over authorship of an alternate version—with a revised melody and no lyrics—of 
the Duke Ellington standard “Satin Doll”); see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, A Musical 
Work Is a Set of Instructions, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 467, 498 (2014) (construing infringement 
inquiries as typically being limited to “melody, which is typically given primary 
consideration, and to a lesser extent harmony and rhythm.”). 
100 Tod Machover & Charles Holbrow, Toward New Musics: What the Future Holds for 
Sound Creativity, NPR (July 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/26/
745315045/towards-new-musics-what-the-future-holds-for-sound-creativity 
[https://perma.cc/K2PH-NX3G]. 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
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recordings embodying the compositions at issue.103 Accordingly, 
these defendants may have mimicked an array of elements present 
in a plaintiff’s recording that may not appear in any written reduc-
tion, such as performance expression, sonic timbre, production  
effects, and nuanced instrumental arrangements. Consequently, 
courts have been left to decide which of these elements are legally 
part of the underlying composition, and which are irrelevant to a 
claim of composition infringement. The doctrine emerging from 
these efforts is anything but straightforward. 
2. Modern Doctrine 
While there is general consensus that any given sound recording 
contains elements that fall outside the scope of the composition it 
embodies,104 the next step—surveying the border between the two 
copyrights—becomes trickier. Broadly speaking, courts view the 
composition copyright as encompassing “the generic sound that 
would necessarily result from any performance of the piece.”105 
Conversely, a sound recording consists of the “sound produced by 
the performer’s rendition of the musical work.”106 
Writing in pre-Blurred Lines 2011, Professor Jamie Lund  
referred to the traditional conception of composition as a bundle of 
“rhythm, harmony, and melody” as the “dominant rule.”107 She 
acknowledged, however, “passing references to the contrary” and 
 
103 See infra Part II.D. 
104 See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 25, § 2.05[A] (“[I]t stretches matters too far to conclude 
that everything on the recording forms part of the musical composition.”). 
105 Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 349 F.3d 
591 (9th Cir. 2003), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 388 F.3d 1189 
(9th Cir. 2004), and aff’d, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004). 
106 Id. (citing NIMMER, supra note 25); see Dustin Mets, Did Congress Protect the 
Recording Industry into Competition? The Irony of the Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings Act, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV 371, 372–73 (1997); Lund, supra note 26, at 145. 
107 Lund, supra note 26, at 144; see, e.g., Rose v. Hewson, No. 17–CV–1471 (DLC), 
2018 WL 626350, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018) (dismissing an infringement claim 
brought against U2, based on allegedly similar guitar solos: “a court considers only a song’s 
composition—the notes, rhythm, and harmony, for example—and does not consider 
elements of performance of the composition, like the skill with which the composition is 
played.”). Even after Blurred Lines, this approach persisted: “The way things have always 
worked, the story goes,” wrote Professor Joseph Fishman in 2018, “only tunes and words 
are explicitly covered.” Fishman, supra note 15, at 1872. 
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cited to the court’s contention in Swirsky v. Carey that “[o]ther 
courts have taken account of additional components of musical  
compositions, including melody, harmony, rhythm, pitch, tempo, 
phrasing, structure, chord progressions, and lyrics.”108 To that end, 
while some courts have expressly denied protection to performance 
elements present on a recording, such as the timbre and performance 
techniques of a recorded flute,109 at least one court has declined  
to consider any element of a recording to be outside the scope of  
compositional protection.110 
Meanwhile, recent cases have accelerated the effective expan-
sion of the legal bounds of the composition.111 Led by Blurred Lines, 
they have illuminated the reality that “what the law means when it 
says ‘music’ . . . is no longer anywhere near as uniform as the pop-
ular condemnation of the [Blurred Lines] outcome would sug-
gest.”112 Prospective plaintiffs have taken notice and asserted claims 
far adrift from the traditional ‘“words and melody’” paradigm.113 
3. Protectable, Unprotectable, or “Constellation” 
Despite a wealth of case law on the topic, no set definition has 
emerged to distinguish protectable elements of a composition from 
musical elements that are not protectable. Protectable elements may 
include “melodic lines, harmonic lines, and percussive parts,” along 
with original combinations of these elements and other elements that 
 
108 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended on denial of reh’g 
(9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2004) (reversing the district court’s summary judgment for defendants—
Mariah Carey, and her co-writers—on the work “Thank God I Found You,” who were 
alleged to have copied the chorus of “One of Those Love Songs,” as performed by Xscape). 
The court also noted that “commentators have opined that timbre, tone, spatial 
organization, consonance, dissonance, accents, note choice, combinations, interplay of 
instruments, basslines, and new technological sounds can all be elements of a musical 
composition.” Id. 
109 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191–94 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district 
court’s summary judgment for defendants, the Beastie Boys, whose record “Pass The Mic” 
had included a flute sample, for which a sound recording—but not a composition—sample 
license had been secured). In finding no “substantial” copying of the composition, the court 
distinguished the recorded flautist’s “highly developed performance techniques” from “a 
generic rendition of the composition.” Id. 
110 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009). 
111 See infra Part II.D. 
112 Fishman, supra note 15, at 1868–69. 
113 See id. at 1890. 
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are not protectable on their own.114 Meanwhile, “musical concepts, 
musical motifs, or trite or commonplace musical expressions” are 
not protectable.115 Nor, at least doctrinally, can protection extend to 
musical styles or genres.116 In practice, the precise line between pro-
tectable and unprotectable expression is “largely a matter of fact to 
be decided by the jury.”117 
While compilations of otherwise unprotectable elements may re-
ceive protection,118 there is no clear threshold for what constitutes a 
protectable critical mass of otherwise unprotectable elements.119 
The boundaries become especially difficult to navigate in modern 
infringement cases involving recorded works whose aesthetic  
impacts combine different kinds of elements that may not be indi-
vidually protectable. For example, the Blurred Lines claim120  
primarily centered around what the Gaye estate’s expert referred to 
as “constellations” of melodic similarities—some of which may 
have been too commonplace or fleeting to be individually pro-
 
114 Social Justice, supra note 66, at 7–8; see also 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON 
COPYRIGHT § 3:93 (last updated Sept. 2019); Brauneis, supra note 30, at 16 (“[I]n many of 
the cases in which courts articulated a definition of musical works in terms of a finite list 
of elements, they were not rejecting other elements [but rather] articulating what they were 
used to seeing in thinly notated sheet music or lead sheets.”). 
115 Maureen Baker, Note, La(w)—A Note to Follow So: Have We Forgotten the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in Music Plagiarism Cases?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1583, 1590 (1992). 
116 See Madison, supra note 7, at 193. 
117 See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming a jury verdict that the Michael Bolton hit “Love is a Wonderful Thing” had 
infringed a “unique compilation of [five unprotectable] elements” from the Isley Brothers 
work of the same name). 
118 Id. at 485–86 (“Each note in a scale, for example, is not protectable, but a pattern of 
notes in a tune may earn copyright protection.”). 
119 This has not prevented folklore from arising among musicians regarding the existence 
of a mythical bright line separating innocuous influence from infringement. See, e.g., Janet 
Fries & Jennifer T. Criss, Debunking Copyright Myths, 11 LANDSLIDE 35, 37 (2019); D. 
Pinter, Plagiarism or Inspiration?, SOUNDSCAPES (Sept. 2015), http://www.icce.rug.nl/
~soundscapes/VOLUME18/Plagiarism_or_inspiration.shtml [https://perma.cc/PKR9-
S8K3]; Is There a “Four Note” Rule that Defines Plagiarism in Music?, STACK 
EXCHANGE, https://musicfans.stackexchange.com/questions/5080/is-there-a-four-note-
rule-that-defines-plagiarism-in-music/5093 [https://perma.cc/VMW5-C5BS]. 
120 See infra Part II.D. 
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tectable—and arrangement devices such as basslines, percussive el-
ements, keyboard parts, and background vocals.121 
B. Scope of Protection 
Separate from the debate over which species of musical  
expression can conceivably be protectable, a distinct inquiry  
addresses the extent to which a specific composition’s protection is 
constrained by the information its copyright registration conveys. 
The administrative rules governing registration procedures began to 
change with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.122 Nearly five 
decades later, the doctrinal significance of those changes  
remains unsettled. 
1. Pre-1978 and Post-1978 Copyright Office Regulation 
Prior to the 1976 Act, which became effective January 1, 
1978,123 a musical composition “could receive federal copyright 
protection either through registration and submission of a deposit 
copy [with the Copyright Office] or through publication.”124 The 
purpose of the deposit copy is to allow the Copyright Office, and the 
public, “to identify the work in which the registrant claims a copy-
right”125 and “to ascertain precisely what [is] the subject of copy-
right.”126 Before the 1976 Act, the Copyright Office did not accept 
sound recordings as deposit copies to substantiate the registration of 
their underlying compositions.127 
 
121 See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018). The doctrine of scènes à 
faire precludes protection for “the indispensable or standard aspects of a work.” Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 2009). 
122 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2018). 
123 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
124 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1132 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc 
granted sub nom. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh’g 
en banc sub nom. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 9, 2020) (“[D]istributing phonorecords did not constitute publication under the 1909 
Act.”). 
125 Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1161–63 (1st Cir. 
1994), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). 
126 See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at *7 (9th Cir. Mar. 
9, 2020) (quoting Merrell v. Tice, 104 U.S. 557, 561 (1881)). 
127 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 3, 
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 16–56057, 16–56287), 2019 
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After Congress extended copyright protection to sound record-
ings, it also provided that composers could now submit sound  
recordings as deposit copies for their composition copyright regis-
trations.128 Thus, although recordings and compositions formed two 
discrete, self-contained types of intellectual property, one could  
now be used to substantiate the other at the Copyright  
Office.129 With that step, the gradual industry comingling of the two 
foundational formats of musical creativity found its statutory corol-
lary. This was no mere formality: in 1978, 14% of musical work 
registrations were accompanied by sound recording deposit cop-
ies.130 By 2012, that number had risen to 77%.131 
The precise legal significance of the deposit copy remains an 
open issue—one directly implicated in contemporary proceed-
ings,132 and only just recently settled for the first time in the Ninth 
Circuit.133 The central question for pre-1978134 works concerns the 
extent to which copyright protection is limited to the four corners of 
the written deposit copy. By extension, a related inquiry concerns 
the extent to which elements that are present in the recording, but 
not in the written deposit copy, may factor into an infringement 
claim. Though seemingly limited in scope, this inquiry operates  
as a proxy for a more fundamental question that applies to all  
recorded works, regardless of era: where does composition end and 
sound recording begin? 
 
WL 3992659 (arguing that the deposit copy should define the scope of protection for 
unpublished works under the 1909 Act). Because “distributing sound recordings did not 
constitute publication under the 1909 Act,” musical works were only considered published 
for copyright purposes “if the sheet music also was published.” Skidmore, 2020 WL 
1128808, at *7. 
128 Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1132 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 407–08 (1976)). 
129 See id. 
130 See Brauneis, supra note 30, at 28. 
131 See id. (adding that seventeen percent were accompanied by sheet music, and the 
remaining six percent by text/lyrics only). 
132 See infra Part II.D. 
133 See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 
9, 2020). 
134 The inflection point is January 1, 1978, the date the Act became effective. Copyright 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
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2. The Deposit Copy Question 
For popular music works, written deposit copies often take the 
form of “lead sheets.” These simplified reductions typically com-
municate a work’s core vocal melody lines, chord progressions, and 
other prominent instrumental parts such as bass lines, in addition to 
“performance directions such as ‘moderate swing’” and other indi-
cia “designed to be used by professional performers who know how 
to interpret and extrapolate from them.”135 
Courts have typically ascribed significant weight to deposit  
copies for pre-1978 works. Writing in pre-Blurred Lines 2014,  
Professor Robert Brauneis noted that “[d]uring the era that federal 
copyright required fixation of musical works in written notation 
[i.e., pre-1978], the legal concept of the musical work was . . . lim-
ited to the elements represented in that notation.”136 Accordingly, 
performance elements falling outside of the notated reduction were 
outside of the scope of protection.137 The district court in Blurred 
Lines conformed to this understanding. It held that the deposit 
copy—including elements “implied,”138 but not explicitly notated 
therein—defined the scope of protection for “Got to Give It Up.”139 
In upholding the bulk of the jury’s verdict, the Ninth Circuit panel 
“accept[ed], without deciding, the merits of the district court’s rul-
ing” on the deposit copy issue.140 Only a few years later, the Ninth 
 
135 Social Justice, supra note 66, at 22 (suggesting that “[n]o musician believes” that a 
lead sheet reflects the entirety of a modern pop song). But see Brief of Amici Curiae 212 
Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers in Support of Appellants at 15, 17, 
Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nos. 15–56880, 16–55089, 16–55626), 
2016 WL 4592129 (warning that broadening compositional copyright protection beyond 
the type of information notated on a written score would chill creativity: “If copyright were 
to extend [beyond melody, to] the ‘feel’ of a song . . . we lose the next disco, the next 
Motown, the next batch of protest songs.”). 
136 Brauneis, supra note 30, at 18. 
137 See id. 
138 Musicians, supra note 135, at 4–5 (arguing that the district court “emasculated” its 
ruling limiting protection to the deposit copy by allowing the Gaye estate’s expert to testify 
as to elements present in the sound recording that she attested were “implied in the deposit 
copy”). 
139 Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018). 
140 Id. 
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Circuit would revisit the same question—and arrive at the same  
answer—in Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin.141 
3. Creators’ Consensus 
From their bird’s eye view, floating above doctrinal weeds and 
bureaucratic policies, songwriters and musicians—“at least those 
who have been speaking with the press”—are united in expressing 
“incredulity at the notion that non-melodic elements can be proper-
tized.”142 This “prevailing belief” among creators that a composition 
is “little more than its tune” closely resembles the traditional incli-
nation to limit the composition to its notation-friendly melodic, har-
monic, and lyrical elements.143 Creators in the recorded music space 
“have gotten used to recreating existing beats and backing tracks,” 
secure in their belief that it is “copying the melodies that brings  
trouble.”144 When plagiarism accusations pertain to production  
elements, their “reflexive” defense is to say “our melodies are dif-
ferent.”145 Or, per Pharrell Williams: “Look at the sheet music!”146 
C. Infringement Proceedings 
When alleging infringement of a composition, the two basic  
elements a plaintiff must prove are: (1) that the plaintiff owns or 
controls the applicable copyright (this is often uncontested)147 and 
(2) that the defendant copied protected elements of that work.148 
 
141 2020 WL 1128808, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2020) (holding definitively, in an en banc 
opinion, that the scope of copyright for unpublished pre-1978 works is “defined by the 
deposit copy”); see infra Part II.D. 
142 Fishman, supra note 15, at 1872–73; see also infra notes 231–39 and accompanying 
text. 
143 See id. at 1869; SEABROOK, supra note 64, at 201 (confidently articulating the widely 
held belief among creators that “beats and chord progressions can’t be protected under the 
existing copyright laws, which recognize only the melody and lyrics.”). 
144 Fishman, supra note 15, at 1873. 
145 Id. 
146 PAUL LESTER, IN SEARCH OF PHARRELL WILLIAMS 192 (Omnibus Press 2015); see also 
Dan Rys, Pharrell Has Found His Happy Place in the Mainstream, XXL (Mar. 4, 2014), 
https://www.xxlmag.com/news/2014/03/pharrell-found-happy-place-mainstream/ 
[https://perma.cc/B3KB-KJJF]. 
147 See Madison, supra note 7, at 153. 
148 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
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Copying is typically proven through circumstantial evidence show-
ing (1) that the defendant had access149 to the allegedly infringed 
work and (2) that the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s work are 
“substantially similar.”150 
1. Substantial Similarity 
While the various circuit approaches supply their own idiosyn-
crasies, on the balance, their resemblances outweigh their differ-
ences. First, “[s]ubstantial similarity is generally a question of fact 
for a jury.”151 Second, summary judgment is typically “frowned 
upon.”152 Finally, the leading circuits153—the Second and Ninth 
 
149 To show access, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a “reasonable 
possibility” of encountering the alleged infringed work, usually either through 
circumstantial evidence placing the defendant in proximity to the plaintiff’s work, or as is 
common in music cases, because the plaintiff’s work has been “widely disseminated.” See 
Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000). Some circuits have 
employed an “inverse ratio rule,” whereby a greater showing of access reduces the requisite 
level of similarity. See id. at 486. However, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Stairway 
to Heaven to join several other circuits in shuttering the “inverse ratio rule” is likely to 
have a significant impact on the relationship between access and similarity in future 
infringement cases. See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at 
*11–13 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2020); see also Eriq Gardner, Led Zeppelin Wins Latest ‘Stairway 
to Heaven’ Copyright Fight, BILLBOARD (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/9330743/led-zeppelin-stairway-heaven-copyright-dispute-appeals 
[https://perma.cc/P4WG-6H8F] (predicting that the decision “will likely become a new 
standard in copyright infringement cases and may be presented to the Supreme Court.”); 
Bobby Owsinski, Led Zeppelin’s New Copyright Win Might Change How Courts View 
Infringement, MUSIC 3.0 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://music3point0.com/2020/03/11/stairway-
infringement [https://perma.cc/L42X-FXBF] (discussing the decision’s potential effect on 
future infringement cases). 
150 See id. at 481. 
151 See, e.g., Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also 
Madison, supra note 7, at 154. 
152 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980). 
153 As the respective homes of music industry hubs New York and California, these 
circuits hear the most music copyright cases. See Infringement Resource, supra note 18; 
All Sectors: County Business Patterns by Legal Form of Organization and Employment 
Size Class for U.S., States, and Selected Geographies: 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=&g=0100000US.04000.001&t=Employment&tabl
e=CB1700CBP&tid=CBP2017.CB1700CBP&n=512230&hidePreview=true&vintage=2
017&cid=EMP&lastDisplayedRow=36 [https://perma.cc/LWH5-N4QS] (showing that 
California and New York are home to the greatest number of music publishers, as of 2017). 
Other circuits use similar approaches. See, e.g., Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855 (6th 
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Circuits—each deploy a two-pronged test: first inviting objective, 
expert analysis of the two works,154 and then asking a lay jury to 
subjectively assess similarity.155 In both circuits, expert analysis is 
typically confined to the first prong.156 The second, pivotal prong 
hinges on how the “ordinary observer”157 or “ordinary reasonable 
person” would experience the two works.158 
2. “Filtering Out” 
As a doctrinal matter, substantial similarity analysis is confined 
to the protected elements of a plaintiff’s allegedly infringed work.159 
Courts must make an effort to “extract the unprotectible ele-
ments . . . and ask whether the protectible elements, standing alone, 
are substantially similar.”160 This “filtering out” process generally 
applies to both the objective, analytical inquiries, as well as the 
 
Cir. 2003); Bruemmer v. Reardon, No. 1:11–CV–988, 2013 WL 12123372, at *1 (W.D. 
Mich. Feb. 8, 2013). 
154 See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Ninth 
Circuit’s “extrinsic” test evaluates “external, objective criteria [and] requires analytical 
dissection of a work and expert testimony.”); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 
477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th 
Cir. 1991)) (construing the “intrinsic” test as determining whether a lay person would find 
the “total concept and feel of the works to be substantially similar.”); New Old Music Grp., 
Inc. v. Gottwald, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (articulating the Second Circuit’s 
two-pronged test: (1) that the plaintiff’s work “was ‘actually copied’ and (2) that the 
portion copied amounts to an ‘improper or unlawful appropriation’”); Hamil Am. Inc. v. 
GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1999) (defining substantial similarity as whether a lay 
observer would “regard [the] aesthetic appeal as the same.”). 
155 The Ninth Circuit introduced this approach in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., 
Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp, elaborating that the “intrinsic” test gauges the subjective 
“response of the ordinary reasonable person” to the alleged similarities between works). 
562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
156 Id. (“[Under the intrinsic text] analytic dissection and expert testimony are not 
appropriate.”); see Baker, supra note 115, at 1594 (“Expert testimony . . . is relevant only 
to show how the ordinary reasonable person may hear the compositions in question.”). 
157 Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2001). 
158 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
159 Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1994) (“[T]he 
unprotectable elements have to be identified, or filtered, before the works can be considered 
as a whole.”) (emphasis added). 
160 Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 3d 492, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Knitwaves, 
Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995)); see Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845 
(“[I]t is essential to distinguish between the protected and unprotected material in a 
plaintiff’s work.”). 
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subjective, “ordinary observer” inquiries.161 In other words, the ma-
terial at the disposal of both expert analysts and lay jurists is sup-
posed to be “filtered” to exclude unprotected material. 
As a practical matter, this can prove difficult. Courts must man-
age an internal tension: on the one hand, they must “attempt to  
extract the unprotectible elements from [substantial similarity]  
consideration.”162 On the other—in an effort to avoid “excessive 
splintering”163—they have also “disavowed” any purported  
requirement to “dissect” works into their most basic atomic  
elements.164 This tension breeds a problematic circularity. Properly 
deferential courts leave the question of a given element’s protecta-
bility to jurors, who are tasked with comparing un-“filtered” works 
in order to determine which material must be “filtered” from  
the plaintiff’s work—only to then ask those same jurors, who  
have already been exposed to unprotected material, to appraise only  
protected elements for similarity between the plaintiff’s and defend-
ant’s works.165 
3. Evidentiary Backdrop 
Because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copy-
right matters, these sorts of evidentiary dilemmas typically fall 
within the purview of the Federal Rules of Evidence.166 For our pur-
poses, the most important of the Federal Rules is Rule 403,167 which 
provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more 
of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
 
161 See Madison, supra note 7, at 154. Here, the leading circuits differ. The Second 
Circuit’s objective prong simply evaluates whether copying, in fact, occurred, regardless 
of the protectability of the elements that were copied. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 
472 (2d Cir. 1946). 
162 Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002. 
163 Mena v. Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc., No. 11–CV–5501 (BSJ), 2012 WL 4741389, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2012). 
164 Griffin, 351 F. Supp. at 499 (reiterating the significance of a work’s “total concept 
and overall feel”). 
165 See supra Part II.A.3. 
166 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 
167 See infra Part III.D. 
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cumulative evidence.”168 This is a direct articulation of the balanc-
ing test underlying much evidentiary theory: that courts should at-
tempt to maximize useful information while minimizing harmful or 
distracting information.169 
To a lesser extent, two rules governing expert testimony also  
influence the role of sound recordings in composition infringement 
trials, by way of musicologist analysis that may flow from those  
recordings. Rule 702 provides that expert testimony must be “relia-
ble” and “help[ful]” to the trier of fact,170 while Rule 703 allows for  
expert testimony to be based on information that may not, itself, be 
admissible “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely 
on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the sub-
ject.”171 These evidentiary matters have played a central role in  
several recent proceedings. 
D. Recent Proceedings Featuring Sound Recording Rulings 
Prior to Blurred Lines, modern decisions had already done much 
to collapse the gap between composition and performance/record-
ing. Courts in these cases extended protection to, among other 
things, recorded drumbeats, rhythmic patterns, guitar riffs,172 as well 
as the “musical punctuation” of the recorded vocal performance  
of the word “dog” and some surrounding vocal “panting.”173 How-
ever, other decisions took greater care to distinguish between sound 
 
168 Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
169 See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (advisory committee’s note). 
170 Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
171 Fed. R. Evid. 703. 
172 See Fishman, supra note 15, at 1889 (citing New Old Music Grp., Inc. v. Gottwald, 
122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 97 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (denying defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the drum groove from the recording embodying plaintiffs’ 
composition could “reasonably be described as the driving groove, or backbone, of the 
song”)); BMS Entm’t/Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, No. 04 Civ. 2584, 2005 WL 1593013, 
at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment based 
on similarity of rhythmic patterns in a “call-and-response” as embodied on a recording 
embodying plaintiff’s work); ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 983, 986 (W.D. 
Wash. 1999) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on liability, construing the 
guitar riff as embodied in a ZZ Top record as part of the underlying composition). 
173 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 276 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming a verdict of infringement, finding no prejudicial error in the district court’s 
decision to allow the jury to consider these elements—which did not appear in the sheet 
music—from the George Clinton record “Atomic Dog”). 
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recordings and the compositions embodied therein.174 At least one 
pre-Blurred Lines court, citing a “significant risk of confusing and 
misleading the jury,” invoked the composition/recording distinction 
in an evidentiary context by barring the use of a sound recording at 
trial.175 More recently, starting with Blurred Lines, three proceed-
ings have touched directly upon this collision of formal composi-
tional protection and functional evidentiary rulings. 
1. Blurred Lines 
“The majority allows the Gayes to accomplish what no one has 
before: copyright[ing] a musical style.”176 This flourish—from the 
lone dissenting judge on the Ninth Circuit panel that upheld the bulk 
of the district court’s finding that “Blurred Lines” had indeed in-
fringed “Got to Give It Up”—neatly encapsulated the primary criti-
cisms directed at both the district and circuit court holdings.177 
However it looked to the outside world, the proceedings actually 
presented a somewhat complicated picture. The Thicke Parties  
succeeded in preventing the Gaye estate from introducing the full 
commercial recording of “Got to Give It Up” at trial.178 They also—
at least formally—notched a major victory in convincing the district 
court to limit protection to the work’s deposit copy.179 But the dis-
trict court, in denying summary judgment, held that there was a tri-
able issue of fact as to what musical expression was actually indi-
cated in the deposit copy.180 As a result, at trial, the jury was given 
 
174 See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2004). 
175 Fahmy v. Jay Z, No. 2:07–CV–05715–CAS(PJWx), 2015 WL 5680299, at *14 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 24, 2015) (ruling on several pretrial motions in a proceeding involving an 
allegedly unlicensed sample incorporated into Jay-Z’s hit record, “Big Pimpin”); see 
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their First Motion in Limine, Griffin v. 
Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2019), 2019 WL 2604571, ECF No. 111. 
176 Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., dissenting) 
(“‘Blurred Lines’ and ‘Got to Give It Up’ are not objectively similar. They differ in melody, 
harmony, and rhythm . . . . [T]he majority establishes a dangerous precedent that strikes a 
devastating blow to future musicians and composers everywhere.”). 
177 See supra notes 14–15. 
178 Williams, 895 F.3d at 1127 (majority opinion) (adding that the Thicke Parties 
“vigilantly policed the admission of testimony throughout trial, repeatedly instructing 
counsel to ensure that the experts tethered their testimony to the sheet music.”). 
179 Id. at 1117. 
180 Id. at 1124–25. 
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access to certain musical elements that, on appeal, the Thicke Parties 
argued were outside the scope of compositional protection. 
The district court instructed the jury that it had heard “‘recorded 
versions of each work that each side has prepared based on what 
each side contends is shown in the deposit copy that was filed with 
the Copyright Office.’”181 Thus, it became the jury’s task to simul-
taneously decide what was present or implied in the deposit copy 
(and therefore protectable), and to determine the extent of similarity 
between those works, only among those protected elements.182  
In affirming the bulk of the district court’s ruling, the Ninth  
Circuit majority noted that the experts for both sides “referenced  
the sound recording” and “agreed that sheet music requires interpre-
tation,” so “[t]he question of whose interpretation of the deposit 
copy to credit was a question properly left for the jury to resolve.”183 
On appeal, the Thicke Parties also argued that the district court 
had improperly allowed the Gaye estate’s experts to “play audio 
‘mash-ups’ superimposing” Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up” vocals  
onto the “Blurred Lines” accompaniment, and vice versa, and that 
these mash-ups contained the following unprotected elements: bass 
melodies, keyboard parts, and Marvin Gaye’s vocal performance.184 
On appeal, the Thicke Parties contended that Rule 403 “required ex-
clusion of such evidence”—that the confusion likely to be caused by 
 
181 Id. (quoting jury instructions from district court). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 1125–26. But see id. at 1149 (Nguyen, J., dissenting) (stating that the Gayes’ 
expert’s testimony regarding similarities in bass melodies was “of questionable value” 
because “when comparing them, she showed the jury the . . . bass line that she had 
transcribed from the sound recording” where, importantly, “several notes were different in 
the deposit copy”). Citing Rule 702’s helpfulness requirement, the Thicke Parties had also 
sought to exclude portions of her testimony that had been based on the “Got to Give It Up” 
sound recording. Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LACV13–06004 JAK(AGRx), 
2015 WL 4479500, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018). 
184 Williams, 895 F.3d at 1126. See Oral Argument at 1:22, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 
1150 (2018) (No. 15–56880), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_
vid=0000012297 [https://perma.cc/4E27-BHJG] (“If you filtered out the unprotectable 
elements, it would have been a different case.”). 
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these mash-ups trumped their minimal relevance.185 They empha-
sized that “any number of melodies . . . could fit over the relatively 
simple chord pattern of ‘Blurred Lines.’”186 Relying upon its history 
of allowing mash-ups to be performed for juries, and noting that any 
flaws in mash-up conception or execution were subject to cross-ex-
amination, the Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the dis-
trict court’s decision.187 The panel “accept[ed], without deciding, 
the merits of the district court’s ruling” to limit protection to the de-
posit copy—the ruling that had precipitated the district court’s deci-
sion to exclude the full commercial “Got to Give It Up” sound re-
cording from trial.188 Fortuitously, the Ninth Circuit would get an-
other crack at the deposit copy issue very soon.189 
Today, Blurred Lines continues to represent an important dis-
connect between formal and functional considerations. Formally, 
the court actually furthered the more limited conception of the com-
position that its decision’s creative and industry critics  
endorse. However, the court’s permissive “leave it to the jury” evi-
dentiary approach allowed elements of the sound recording to play 
the functional role that those same critics fear can unduly sway  
jurors’ perceptions of similarity.190 As a result, Blurred Lines high-
lights the significance of the evidentiary debate within music copy-
right infringement proceedings, as distinct from the doctrinal dis-
cussion surrounding the scope of protection for musical works. 
2. Stairway to Heaven 
In 2014, a trustee with an interest in the work “Taurus,” as per-
formed by the band Spirit, filed an infringement complaint against 
 
185 Third Brief on Cross Appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees Pharrell 
Williams, Robin Thicke, Clifford Harris, Jr., and More Water from Nazareth Publishing, 
Inc. at 32, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nos. 15–56880, 16–55089, 
16–55626), 2017 WL 1633159. 
186 Id. 
187 Williams, 895 F.3d at 1126–27. 
188 Id. at 1121 (9th Cir. 2018). 
189 See infra Part II.D.2. 
190 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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Led Zeppelin.191 At issue: Led Zeppelin’s ubiquitous “Stairway to 
Heaven” chromatic guitar arpeggio intro.192 The trial primarily 
hinged on two issues: (1) access—Led Zeppelin had toured with 
Spirit during a period of time when Spirit would regularly perform 
“Taurus” live193; and (2) prior art—whether similar chromatic ar-
peggios had appeared in works prior to “Taurus.”194 
The litigation also addressed the novel legal question of  
whether, for pre-1978 works governed by the 1909 Copyright Act, 
“the deposit copy defines the scope of the copyright.”195 The district 
court said yes, and relied on this judgment in barring certain sound 
recordings of “Taurus” from being used at trial; the jury ultimately 
found no substantial similarity under the extrinsic test.196 On  
appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the decision to limit protec-
tion to the deposit copy, but vacated and remanded based on jury 
instruction errors, and because “the district court abused its discre-
tion by not allowing the sound recordings of ‘Taurus’ to be played 
to prove access.”197 On June 10, 2019, the Ninth Circuit vacated the 
panel’s ruling and issued an order for an en banc rehearing.198 Nine 
months later, the full Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict, and 
held that the deposit copy does indeed define the scope of  
copyright for unpublished pre-1978 works such as “Taurus.”199 
 
191 Copyright Row Over Led Zeppelin Classic Stairway to Heaven, BBC NEWS (May 21, 
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-27497950 [https://perma.cc/GAN7-
QVN5]. 
192 Amici Curiae Brief of Musicologists in Support of Defendants-Appellees at En Banc 
Rehearing at 6, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 16–56057, 
16–56287), 2019 WL 2996345 (“Like varied colored flecks of paint, arpeggios and 
descending bass lines are musical ideas that must remain freely available to composers.”). 
193 See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc 
granted sub nom. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019), and on reh’g 
en banc sub nom. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 9, 2020). 
194 Musicologists’ Brief, supra note 192, at 12. 
195 Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1131–32 (noting that “Taurus” was registered in 1967, prior to 
publication, under the 1909 Act). 
196 Id. at 1130–31. 
197 Id. at 1137. 
198 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 2019). 
199 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 
2020). At the time this Note is being finalized, no petition for certiorari has been filed, 
although one may well be imminent. See Letter Addressed to Judge Louis L. Stanton from 
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At trial, issues surrounding the use of sound recordings took cen-
ter stage. The plaintiff moved for the admission of several studio 
and live “Taurus” recordings to be played for Led Zeppelin guitarist 
and songwriter Jimmy Page on the stand, so that he could then be 
asked whether he had ever heard them.200 The district court agreed 
that the recordings were relevant for access, but that playing the  
recordings in front of the jury would be too prejudicial.201 As a  
result, the court allowed the recordings to be played for Page outside 
of the presence of the jury, and then for questioning stemming from 
his impressions of the recordings to take place in front of the jury.202 
This decision was grounded in a Rule 403 analysis.203 The court 
construed the recordings’ probative value as pertaining to access 
only—because the recordings contained elements falling beyond the 
scope of the deposit copy, they were not probative of the protected 
elements of the work “Taurus.”204 Therefore, the court reasoned,  
allowing the jury to hear the recordings would pose a significant 
prejudicial risk sufficient to justify precluding the minimally proba-
tive evidence.205 
This was a major victory for the defendants; the extent of this 
prejudicial effect had been a matter of significant pretrial contention. 
In their motion in limine to exclude the sound recordings, the  
defendants had stressed the “impossib[ility]” of expecting a lay jury 
to both “identify the material and elements that are not in the 1967 
 
Hillel I. Parness, Structured Asset Sales, LLC v. Sheeran, No. 1:18-cv-05839-LLS 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2020), ECF No. 148 (attorney for one of the Thinking Out Loud 
plaintiffs, Structured Asset Sales, LLC, reporting that “[c]counsel for the plaintiffs in the 
Skidmore case has told [Structured Asset Sales’] principal that he will be petitioning for 
certiorari”). 
200 Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1123–24. There were also several 703-adjacent issues regarding 
whether expert testimony could be based on the recording. See Defendants’ Reply in 
Support of Motion in Limine No. 4 and Daubert Motion to Exclude Stewart, Johnson, 
Bricklin, and Hanson, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 2:15–CV–03462–RGK–AGR (C.D. 
Cal. May 10, 2016), 2016 WL 2771264 (“[T]he reports plaintiff’s witnesses did provide 
are fatally flawed because his witnesses base their opinions on elements not protected by 
the Taurus copyright.”). 
201 Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1123–24. 
202 Id. 
203 See id. at 1135 n.36. 
204 Id. (“Here, the district court abused its discretion.”). 
205 Id. 
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transcription” and to “disregard those materials and elements” as 
unprotected for the purposes of substantial similarity.206 In its  
now-vacated remand, the Ninth Circuit panel countered that “the 
risk of unfair prejudice or jury confusion was relatively small and 
could have been reduced further with a proper admonition . . . that 
the recordings . . . were not to be used to judge substantial similar-
ity.”207 The en banc Ninth Circuit disagreed: it deemed the trial 
court’s exclusion of the sound recording proper “[t]o prevent the 
jury from making an erroneous comparison for determining substan-
tial similarity.”208 
Like Blurred Lines before it, the Stairway to Heaven proceed-
ings highlight the importance of evidentiary concerns, distinct from 
their adjacent doctrinal questions. Even where there is agreement—
as there was here—among the trial and appellate courts regarding 
the significance of the deposit copy, judicial perspectives vary  
regarding how to manifest those rulings in the courtroom. When 
should recordings be barred entirely? When are other precautions, 
such as limiting instructions to the jury, sufficient? Indeed, given the 
doctrinal consensus between the trial and appellate courts on the  
deposit copy issue, the seesawing evidentiary directives defining the 
district, panel, and en banc decisions have together reinforced the 
proposition that what jurors actually see and hear matters quite as 
much as what they are technically permitted to consider. 
 
206 Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion in Limine No. 3 to Exclude Taurus Audio 
Recordings, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, Skidmore v. Led 
Zeppelin, No. 2:15–CV–03462–RGK–AGR (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2016), 2016 WL 2771260 
(emphasis added). 
207 Skidmore, 905 F.3d at 1135. But see Brief Amici Curiae of the Recording Industry 
Association of America and the National Music Publishers Association in Support of 
Defendants-Appellees on en Banc Rehearing at 5, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 
(9th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 16–56057, 16–56287), 2019 WL 3763847 (criticizing the Ninth 
Circuit panel’s 403 approach: “[T]he jury was going to get vanishingly little probative 
information by watching Page while he listened to ‘Taurus’ being played.”). 
208 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at *10 (9th Cir. Mar. 
9, 2020) (“There would have been very little, if any, probative value in watching Page’s 
reaction to listening to Taurus at the trial in 2016 to prove access to the song half a century 
ago.”) (emphasis removed). 
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3. Thinking Out Loud 
Only a few years removed from Blurred Lines, a second visible 
litigation involving a Marvin Gaye classic currently209 awaits reso-
lution—this time in the Second Circuit. Two separate parties with 
an interest in “Let’s Get It On” have filed infringement claims in the 
Southern District of New York centering around Ed Sheeran’s 2013 
hit “Thinking Out Loud.”210 The claims rely heavily on non-melodic 
copying; the plaintiffs allege that the two works share substantially 
similar basslines, chord progressions, and drum patterns.211 
As in Stairway to Heaven, the parties bitterly contest whether 
the deposit copy defines the bounds of copyright protection.212 The 
two sides disagree on the extent to which the bassline and percussion 
elements alleged to have been lifted by the “Thinking Out Loud” 
writers are actually part of the composition “Let’s Get It On.”  
The defendants argue that the composition is defined by the four 
corners of the deposit copy, which does not contain any bass or drum 
notation (although the plaintiffs argue that the bassline is  
implied by the deposit copy’s syncopated harmonic rhythm).213 
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs contend “that the composition is embodied 
on the Gaye recording, which is the first mechanical reproduction of 
[Let’s Get It On]” and which does contain the relevant bass and 
drum material.214 
 
209 This Note is entering its final stages of publication in mid-April 2020. 
210 See Eriq Gardner, Ed Sheeran’s Copyright Battles Are Much Weirder Than Anyone 
Can Imagine, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (June 28, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.hollywood
reporter.com/thr-esq/ed-sheerans-copyright-battles-are-weirder-anyone-can-imagine-
1123850 [https://perma.cc/XGM5-EBP7]. 
211 Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 3d 492, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
212 See id. at 495–96. 
213 Griffin, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 495–96. The parties also dispute how closely Gaye’s 
recorded vocal performance mirrors the notated deposit copy melody line. Id. 
214 Id. at 496 (denying summary judgment). Interestingly, several of plaintiffs’ pretrial 
documents mention other recordings, aside from the two works’ commercial releases, 
including a “demo recording of [“Thinking Out Loud”] that Sheeran and Amy Wadge 
recorded in Sheeran’s kitchen in England,” as well as a recording of Sheeran performing a 
live mash-up in which he toggled seamlessly between “Thinking Out Loud” and “Let’s Get 
It On.” See Reply Declaration of Ilene S. Farkas, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018), ECF No. 85; Exhibit 6, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2017), ECF No. 67–6 (Plaintiffs’ expert’s initial report, referencing 
livia4912, Thinking Out Loud (Lets Get It On) by Ed Sheeran, YOUTUBE (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RxZjVZKVN7k [https://perma.cc/9R6D-MY4D]). 
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After initially staying proceedings on July 2, 2019, pending res-
olution of the Stairway to Heaven appeal, the court eventually sided 
with the defendants.215 The en banc Ninth Circuit issued its Stairway 
to Heaven opinion on March 9, 2020.216 Fifteen days later, the 
Thinking Out Loud court granted the defendants’ motion in limine 
“limiting Plaintiffs to comparing Thinking Out Loud with the musi-
cal composition Let’s Get It On as reflected in the deposit copy.”217 
The court also granted—with some qualification—the defend-
ants’ motions seeking to limit the role that sound recordings embod-
ying “Let’s Get It On” may play at trial.218 Citing Rule 403, the  
defendants had moved to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing  
testimony or other evidence comparing “Thinking Out Loud” to  
elements contained only in a “particular recorded version” of “Let’s 
Get It On,” or that may merely be “implied” in the “Let’s Get It On” 
deposit copy219; and to prevent the commercial sound recording of 
“Let’s Get It On” from being performed at trial, full-stop.220 The 
court ruled that “[t]he Gaye sound recording is inadmissible in any 
way which might confuse the jury into thinking it represents what is 
 
215 Order, Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2019) (No. 1:17–
CV–05221), ECF No. 119. 
216 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 16-56057, 2020 WL 1128808, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 
2020). 
217 See Notice of Motion—Defendants’ First Motion in Limine, Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 
F. Supp. 3d 492 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2019) (No. 1:17–CV–05221), ECF No. 109 (italics 
removed). The court initially denied this motion, but noted that the denial was “without 
prejudice and with leave to renew” at the conference that was to be scheduled “within 10 
days” following the en banc decision in Stairway to Heaven. See id.; see also Motion in 
Limine Denied with Leave to Renew, Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 3d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 12, 2020) (No. 1:17–CV–05221), ECF No. 120. Although his rulings in Thinking Out 
Loud would not technically be bound by Stairway to Heaven, Judge Stanton had previously 
stated that “[w]hatever the Ninth Circuit says, it’s going to be damned educational. . . . To 
proceed in willful ignorance of them is folly.” Bill Donahue, How Will ‘Stairway’ Ruling 
Hit Other Big Music Cases?, LAW360 (Mar. 11, 2020, 10:27 PM), https://www.law
360.com/ip/articles/1252546/how-will-stairway-ruling-hit-other-big-music-cases-?nl_pk=
892fdd10-89d8-4d9c-875a-d936bdc96875&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=
email&utm_campaign=ip (subscription paywall). True to its word, the court reversed 
course after Stairway to Heaven. See Opinion & Order on Defendants’ First Motion in 
Limine, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020), ECF No. 121. 
218 See Griffin et al, supra note 217. 
219 Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 175, at 9–11. 
220 Notice of Motion—Defendants’ First Motion in Limine, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–
CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2019), ECF No. 109. 
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protected by copyright” and that “[t]o that extent, Defendants’ . . . 
in limine requests are granted.”221 However, it deferred the details 
“until trial.”222 While it suggested that playing or referring to “por-
tions, or the whole Gaye sound recording” at trial presently 
“seems . . . barred by Fed. R. Evid. 403,” the court signaled that 
“there may arise circumstances or arguments under which they may 
be admissible.”223 At the time this Note is being finalized, the pre-
cise application of these rulings is yet to be tested. 
If and when Thinking Out Loud does proceed to trial—and  
perhaps to appeal—it will provide an opportunity for another circuit 
to develop case law governing when compositional protection is 
limited to the deposit copy, and when elements found only in  
recordings may be protected. Importantly, like its predecessors, it 
will also provide another test case for how these doctrinal decisions 
impact evidentiary rulings—and by extension, jurors’ perceptions  
of similarity. 
III. STICKSHIFTS AND SAFETYBELTS: POLICY PROS AND CONS 
The debate over the use of sound recordings in infringement  
trials is inextricably linked with the debate over how to define the 
bounds of a given composition. Any attempt to evaluate how proba-
tive or prejudicial a piece of evidence is to a compositional  
infringement claim inevitably depends on how one defines the com-
position in the first place. Accordingly, Part III navigates the inter-
section of policy implications inherent to each issue, while Part IV 
proposes a judicial framework that explicitly accounts for their over-
lap. First, Part III.A enumerates the policy pros and cons of an ex-
panded view of what constitutes compositional creativity. Then, Part 
III.B compares the pros and cons of the unrestricted use of sound 
recordings in composition infringement trials. 
 
221 Griffin et al, supra note 217. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
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A. Pros and Cons of an Expanded Definition of “Composition” 
There are many avenues for creative musical expression that fall 
outside of what has traditionally been understood to be composi-
tional. Indeed, the advent of modern recording technology has al-
lowed for the proliferation of production creativity to the point that 
some argue “more original expression [can] be found, typically, in 
the visual and audio recordings of a performance of a song than in 
the underlying musical work.”224 What’s more, they continue, in 
modern pop music, whether “measured by . . . authorial focus or 
commercial importance, production matters as much as the melodies 
that are ultimately appended to it.”225 
Still, the narrow construction of the composition is grounded in 
centuries of musical tradition.226 It continues to define the modern 
industrial organization of the music sector,227 and remains ubiqui-
tous among both creators and the infrastructure that supports 
them.228 Part III.A explores these, and other, policy arguments sur-
rounding an expanded understanding of the musical composition. 
1. Cons: Arguments for the Traditional Definition of 
“Composition”229 
Arguments for preserving the traditional understanding of the 
composition tend, naturally, to be rooted in tradition. But that  
tradition represents more than mere complacent inertia—it reflects 
creators’ expectations and preferences, and facilitates a predictable, 
stable, manageable ecosystem that allows songwriters to feel safe 
creating music. 
 
224 Fishman, supra note 15, at 1900; see also Gabriel Jacob Fleet, Note, What’s in A 
Song? Copyright’s Unfair Treatment of Record Producers and Side Musicians, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 1235, 1279 (2008). 
225 Fishman, supra note 15, at 1900. 
226 See supra Part I. 
227 Kevin Cornell, Breaking Down Copyrights in Music, TUNECORE (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.tunecore.com/blog/2016/12/breaking-copyrights-music.html 
[https://perma.cc/NPR8-4MCU]. 
228 See supra Part II.B.3. 
229 This Note will discuss the “Cons” first, because they reflect the incumbent consensus 
among creators and their industry agents. 
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a) The Expanded Definition Defies Prevailing Industry 
Understanding and Preference 
Does it really make sense to extend rights designed to protect 
music creators beyond where those same creators are telling us they 
should extend? The industry has organically evolved a culture that 
largely self-regulates around a consensus understanding that a com-
position is defined, if perhaps not literally by the sheet music  
conveying that composition, then by the type of expression captured 
in traditional sheet music notation.230 If composers themselves, and 
their agents, have always believed that the term “composition”  
refers to lyrics and melody, and, to a lesser extent, harmony  
and rhythm, why should courts impose a more expansive under-
standing? Why force a change that strengthens songwriter protection 
upon songwriters who are, by near consensus, not clamoring for  
that change? 
In fact, composers are not merely ambivalent about expanding 
the scope of protection governing their core unit of currency; they 
are insistent that it is having a chilling effect on their creativity.231 
“[Blurred Lines] is definitely striking fear into the hearts of song-
writers,” says singer-songwriter Bonnie McKee.232 “We’re all 
standing on the shoulders of giants,” warns the R&B artist  
Miguel.233 “There’s nothing that hasn’t been done.”234 A group of 
 
230 See supra Part II.B.3. 
231 See, e.g., Jon Caramanica, It’s Got a Great Beat, and You Can File a Lawsuit to It, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/arts/music/pop-music-
songs-lawsuits.html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock [https://perma.cc/NP6K-
QTB9]; Michael Donaldson, How Songwriters Got Thrown into a Minefield, SYNCHTANK 
(Jan. 19, 2020), https://www.synchtank.com/blog/how-songwriters-got-thrown-into-a-
minefield/ [https://perma.cc/QLZ8-FHQ9]. But see Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around 
Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2015). 
232 Madison, supra note 7, at 151. While the en banc Stairway to Heaven decision, 
combined a week later with a district court’s decision to throw out an infringement verdict 
against Katy Perry, have led some to suggest that “the ‘Blurred Lines’ curse—its chilling 
effect—has been lifted,” creator uncertainty is unlikely to evaporate overnight. See Sisario 
supra note 18 (quoting Katy Perry’s attorney and noted copyright litigator Christine 
Lepera). 
233 Associated Press, Miguel Explores Race, Finds New Voice On ‘Wildheart’, 
BILLBOARD (July 13, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6627416/miguel-
explores-race-finds-new-voice-on-wildheart [https://perma.cc/V7YA-N3LQ]. 
234 Id. 
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musicians writing as amici for the Thicke Parties in Blurred Lines 
articulated their concern “about the potential adverse impact on their 
own creativity, on the creativity of future artists, and on the music 
industry in general. . . . [T]he verdict in this case threatens  
to punish songwriters for creating new music that is inspired by  
prior works.”235 
Commentators recognize that, practically, there is very little 
wholly original creation in music.236 New music is constructed using 
“building blocks from a vast historical trove of previously expressed 
ideas.”237 This reality endows a natural tension into copyright, 
where the line between inspiration and theft is not always clear.238 
Courts have the opportunity to calibrate that line wherever they see 
fit. Naturally, too permissive an environment risks depressing the 
value of copyright through rendering it unenforceable. 
Still, it is telling that the very creators who would suffer most 
from this deflation are the loudest voices bemoaning the recent  
infringement boom. As Professor Joseph Fishman has argued,  
perhaps the continued emphasis on melody as the predominant com-
positional feature “should be justified not as a recognition of its 
composer’s creativity but rather as a facilitation of downstream 
 
235 Musicians, supra note 135, at 2 ( “[A] budding songwriter . . . is going to think twice 
before he or she writes a song that ‘feels’ like a Marvin Gaye song or any other artist’s 
song, always with one foot in the recording studio and one foot in the courtroom.”); see 
also Brief of Amicus Curae Musicologists in Support of Defendants’ Renewed Motion for 
Judgment as a Matter of Law or, Alternatively, for a New Trial at 2, Gray v. Perry, No. 
2:15–CV–05642–CAS–JC (C.D. Cal. 2018), No. 500–2 (“This confusion and uncertainty, 
in turn, is inhibiting the work of songwriters and the American music industry at 
large . . . .”). 
236 See, e.g., Madison, supra note 7, at 151. 
237 Id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae 123 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and 
Producers, Along With Nsai and Sona, in Support of Defendants/Appellees at en Banc 
Rehearing at 20, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 16–56057, 
16–56287), 2018 WL 9441019 (expressing gratitude and respect for copyright protection: 
“No conscientious songwriter wants to copy someone else’s music; nor do they want 
someone else to copy theirs . . . . However, Amici also understand that, like the music that 
was created before them, their own music will serve as building blocks for future 
songwriters.”). 
238 See Olivia Lattanza, The Blurred Protection for the Feel or Groove of a Song Under 
Copyright Law: Examining the Implications of Williams v. Gaye on Creativity in Music, 
35 TOURO L. REV. 723 (2019). 
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composers’ future creativity.”239 Indeed, if creators place greater im-
portance on their ability to continue to create in the future than on 
securing maximal protection for their existing creations, there is  
little reason for courts to construe copyright laws designed to protect 
those very creators in a way that expressly defies their wishes. 
b) Broader Protection Risks Extending Copyright to Ideas, 
Rather Than Expression of those Ideas 
Underlying much of the backlash to the Blurred Lines outcome 
was the perception that the courts had endorsed extending protection 
to a musical style.240 To flirt with allowing protection for  
genres/styles/grooves is to imperil the foundational tenet that 
“[c]opyright protection applies to original expression of ideas, but 
not to the ideas themselves.”241 In Blurred Lines, while “everyone 
agree[d],” at least doctrinally, that a “groove” or “genre” repre-
sented an “unprotectable idea,” in the eyes of the dissent and many 
onlookers, the outcome had the practical effect of protecting what 
should have been an unprotectable idea.242 A similar dynamic looms 
in Thinking Out Loud.243 
c) There is a Fundamental Difference Between 
Composition and Performance 
Also relevant to the Thinking Out Loud proceedings are the core 
creative distinctions between composition and other forms  
 
239 Fishman, supra note 15, at 1869–70. 
240 See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., dissenting); 
Madison, supra note 7, at 193 (“A style cannot be copyrighted because a style is not a 
unique artistic expression.”); Melinda Newman, Top Lawyers on What Songwriters Must 
Learn from ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2015, 12:15 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/melindanewman/2015/03/11/top-lawyers-weigh-in-on-the-
blurred-lines-verdict-and-what-songwriters-must-learn/#327891976bfa 
[https://perma.cc/S88X-M2HH] (“[I]t seemed on its musical face that the groove captured 
by the recorded production may have been influential.”). 
241 Thomas M. Cunningham, Extending Shaw v. Lindheim: Substantial Similarity and the 
Idea-Expression Distinction in Copyright of Non-Literary Subject Matter, 55 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 239, 241 (1993) (analogizing this risk to allowing painters of a landscape to foreclose 
others from painting that same landscape). 
242 Williams, 895 F.3d at 1140. 
243 See supra Part II.D 
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of musical creativity.244 While the workflows and timelines sur-
rounding the composition and recording processes have converged, 
the two copyrights still represent two distinct forms of creativity, 
and two distinct forms of intellectual property.245 The compositional 
process—even when occurring simultaneously to the recording pro-
cess—is a “deliberative process that allows for trial-and-error edit-
ing,” reflection, and revision.246 A recording, on the other hand, cap-
tures a series of performances which are “unrepeatable, evanescent, 
and aural.”247 
Even as modern production practices increasingly resemble 
compositional creativity, a finished recording still represents a  
single, “limited representation” of the composition it embodies.248 
Compositions, on the other hand, are endlessly adaptable to new 
contexts and new creative inputs.249 Even confining oneself to the 
information conveyed in a typical written deposit copy, there are 
 
244 See infra note 338–40 and accompanying text. 
245 See supra Part I. 
246 Brauneis, supra note 30, at 8. 
247 Id. 
248 See Machover, supra note 100. 
249 Furthermore, reading those new contexts into the underlying composition unjustly 
confers onto the composers the fruits of others’ creative labor. Why should songwriter Bob 
Dylan be granted property rights over the iconic “All Along the Watchtower” guitar riff 
that first appears in Jimi Hendrix’s cover version, or songwriter Dolly Parton over Whitney 
Houston’s divergent, oft-imitated vocal phrasings in her cover of “I Will Always Love 
You?” Compare BOB DYLAN, All Along the Watchtower, on JOHN WESLEY HARDING (Sony 
Music Entertainment 1970), with JIMI HENDRIX, All Along the Watchtower, on ELECTRIC 
LADYLAND (Sony Music Entertainment 1968); compare DOLLY PARTON, I Will Always 
Love You, on JOLENE (Sony Music Entertainment 1974), with WHITNEY HOUSTON, I Will 
Always Love You, on THE BODYGUARD—ORIGINAL SOUNDTRACK ALBUM (Arista Records 
1992). This dynamic exists for any recording of a work, not merely covers. See Fleet, supra 
note 224, at 1278 (remarking that, while the “secondary” contributions of producers, side 
musicians, and sound engineers are often “viewed as outside the scope of the musical 
work” for ownership purposes, “primary contributors are allowed to rely on such 
contributions to prove their infringement claims”). Thus, credited songwriters’ copyrights 
are permitted to annex the uncredited creative contributions of others. See id. In response 
to this disconnect, some commentators have discussed expanding copyright protection for 
arrangements, distinct from both the compositions they interpret and the recordings that 
embody them. See, e.g., John R. Zoesch III, ”Discontented Blues”: Jazz Arrangements and 
the Case for Improvements in Copyright Law, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 867, 872 (2006); Jeffrey 
Brandstetter, The Lone Arranger: Have the Courts Unfairly Singled Out Musical 
Arrangements by Denying Them Protection as Derivative Works?, 15 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 
22 (1997). 
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infinite arrangement and production choices that could accompany 
the basic chord progression, structure, and melodic/lyrical material 
reflected in the average lead sheet.250 By contrast, any single  
recording of a given composition is “static” and “terminal.”251 It can 
be affected only by creating a new, derivative sound recording, at 
which point it is of course no longer the same sound recording. 
d) A Narrower Definition Is Simply More Manageable 
But apart from these more abstract issues, the recent prolifera-
tion of infringement claims, jarring verdicts, and industry unrest all 
suggest that the current expansion of infringement fervor poses 
more concrete manageability concerns.252 To the extent that judicial 
economy, predictability, and the reduction of transaction and litiga-
tion costs are virtues unto themselves, then resurfacing the doctrinal 
preeminence of melody may be “the right approach . . . for reasons 
different than the [creative] ones that legal decision makers have 
historically given.”253 Perhaps a more compelling rationale is, 
simply, simplicity—“sacrific[ing] descriptive accuracy for sheer ad-
ministrability”254 and predictability.255 Because substantial similar-
ity has always “present[ed] one of the most difficult questions in 
copyright law,”256 the opportunity to both curb its influence, and  
stabilize its unsteady application, may be worth sacrificing some  
ancillary benefits. 
 
250 See Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 175. 
251 See Machover, supra note 100. 
252 See Kristelia A. García, Improving the Quality and Consistency of Copyright 
Infringement Analysis in Music, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://btlj.org/
2018/01/improving-the-quality-and-consistency-of-copyright-infringement-analysis-in-
music/ [https://perma.cc/9N6E-JGRF] (“[R]ecent litigation in the area has seen 
astronomical verdicts, irreconcilable outcomes, and a propensity toward settlement.”). 
253 Fishman, supra note 15, at 1904. 
254 Id. 
255 See Brief Amici Curiae of 19 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioner 
Led Zeppelin at 13, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(Nos. 16–56057(L), 16–56287), 2019 WL 2996344 (positing that, given the consistent 
historical judicial focus on melody and lyric, “[t]he author of ‘Taurus’ could not have 
reasonably expected his copyright to cover more than the notes of the melodic line.”). 
256 NIMMER, supra note 25, § 13.03[A]. 
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2. Pros: Arguments for an Expanded Definition of 
“Composition” 
Still, what exactly are those ancillary benefits? First, fundamen-
tally, an expanded understanding of the composition mirrors the his-
torical convergence of compositional and recording creative and 
business practices.257 In addition, an expanded view of the compo-
sition could help to allay several inequities exacerbated by the nar-
row, consensus industry view. 
a) A Broader Definition Promotes Fairness 
The annals of pop and rock history are brimming with stories of 
underrecognized creative input—especially surrounding the  
allocation of songwriting credits.258 In one representative example, 
Levon Helm, drummer and singer for The Band, described in his 
autobiography his frustration with the disconnect between his 
group’s collaborative creative process and its concentrated song-
writing credits. “When [our album] came out, we were surprised by 
some of the songwriting credits. In those days, we didn’t realize 
[music publishing] was the secret source of the real money in the 
music business.”259 Helm would famously hold a grudge against the 
group’s primary credited songwriter, Robbie Robertson, until the 
two reportedly reconciled at Helm’s deathbed.260 Helm blamed Rob-
ertson’s monopolization of songwriting credits, and of the resultant 
passive income, for condemning his collaborators to the lifetime of 
 
257 See supra Part I. 
258 See, e.g., Jenny Johnston, We’re Like a Sad Old Couple . . . Only We Can’t Get 
Divorced! The Kinks’ Dave Davies on His Toxic, Lifelong Feud with His Brother Ray, 
DAILY MAIL (May 12, 2017, 11:58 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-
4498022/The-Kinks-Dave-Davies-feud-brother-Ray.html [https://perma.cc/NH6C-
SCNU] (quoting the Kinks’ “peeved” lead guitarist Dave Davies discussing his “richer, 
more overtly successful” older brother Ray, the band’s sole credited songwriter on the 
majority of its output: “Whether he would care to admit it or not, it was a collaboration of 
ideas.”). 
259 LEVON HELM & STEPHEN DAVIS, THIS WHEEL’S ON FIRE: LEVON HELM AND THE STORY 
OF THE BAND 209–10 (Chicago Review Press 2d ed., 2000); see also Lindvall, supra note 
73. 
260 Sean Michaels, Robbie Robertson Seeks Reconciliation at Levon Helm’s Sickbed, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2012, 6:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2012/apr/19/
robbie-robertson-levon-helm [https://perma.cc/JWJ8-A8YH]. 
1362       FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:1311 
 
touring that he believed ultimately contributed to the death of band-
mate Rick Danko.261 
This harsh dynamic is dulled by a culture that defines songwrit-
ing, and, by extension, the compositions themselves, more broadly. 
The kind of arranging, workshopping, and instrumental ingenuity 
that Helm believed was every bit as foundational to The Band’s cre-
ative success as Robertson’s words and melodies262 are much more 
likely to be considered compositional contributions today.263 This 
allows for the financial rewards of musical creation to be spread in 
a manner more reflective of overall creative contribution. 
b) Greater Accessibility of Songwriter Credit 
That approach could pay extra dividends for historically disad-
vantaged and exploited groups of musicians. The expansion of  
liability could help curtail, for example, an “American cultural his-
tory [that] is full of examples of white artists appropriating the  
genius of their less privileged black competitors and predeces-
sors.”264 Indeed, for all the notoriety generated by Stairway to 
Heaven, Led Zeppelin’s problematic knack for ripping off blues art-
ists may ultimately present a better use case for easing plaintiffs’ 
infringement burdens.265 
 
261 HELM, supra note 259, at 209–10. 
262 See id. 
263 See Sutherland, supra note 80. Others have extended this logic beyond uncredited 
instrumentalists to suggest that ownership in musical works should more readily extend to 
other classes of music creators, including sound engineers. See Andrew Nietes, 
Note, Bringing Swirly Music to Life: Why Copyright Law Should Adopt Patent Law 
Standards for Joint Authorship of Sound Engineers, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 1321, 1345 (2019); Fleet, supra note 224, at 1275. 
264 Alex Sayf Cummings, The “Blurred Lines” of Music and Copyright: Part One, 
OUPBLOG (Apr. 28, 2015), https://blog.oup.com/2015/04/blurred-lines-copyright-part-
one/ [https://perma.cc/59CB-CJWA]; see generally Toni Lester, Blurred Lines—Where 
Copyright Ends and Cultural Appropriation Begins-the Case of Robin Thicke Versus 
Bridgeport Music and the Estate of Marvin Gaye, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 217 
(2014) (tracing a long, profitable history of white artists appropriating black art, and 
offering musicological perspectives on how “Blurred Lines” fits that pattern). 
265 See Stereo Williams, Led Zeppelin’s Controversial Legacy: Thievery, Underage 
Groupies and the ‘Mud-Shark Incident’, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 16, 2019, 1:33 PM), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/led-zeppelins-controversial-legacy-thievery-underage-
groupies-and-the-mud-shark-incident?ref=author?ref=author [https://perma.cc/D95Z-
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Additionally, popular songwriting and production are notori-
ously male-dominated fields,266 with women of color especially un-
derrepresented.267 A culture of more inclusive crediting may  
facilitate equity along gender and racial dimensions. It is worth not-
ing, however, that these disparities exist even as the twenty-first cen-
tury, with its catchall crediting culture, enters its third decade268; 
clearly, crediting more contributors as songwriters is not a complete 
remedy, particularly when the classes of creatives enjoying new-
found access to songwriter credits are themselves disproportionately 
male and white.269 
c) Rightsholders Can License Around the New Reality 
Meanwhile, beneath the ongoing debate, it is possible that a nat-
ural compromise is already surfacing: risk-averse rightsholders, rec-
ognizing the increased incidence of litigation in marginal cases, 
 
BEH2]; Paul Resnikoff, Robert Plant and Jimmy Page Openly Admit to Stealing Music, 
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2016), 
https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2016/04/19/robert-plant-and-jimmy-page-blatantly-
admit-to-stealing-their-music-led-zeppelin/ (non-archivable website). 
266 See Ben Sisario, Gender Diversity in the Music Industry? The Numbers Are Grim, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/arts/music/music-
industry-gender-study-women-artists-producers.html [https://perma.cc/2DMP-BFR2]; Gil 
Kaufman, 2020 Songwriters Hall of Fame Inductees Revealed, BILLBOARD (Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/pop/8548194/2020-songwriters-hall-of-
fame-inductees [https://perma.cc/TL5F-94P4]. 
267 See Nicole Pajer, New Report Shows Major Lack of Representation by Women in the 
Music Industry, BILLBOARD (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/
8096196/new-report-shows-major-lack-representation-women-music-industry 
[https://perma.cc/3L96-HBH8]. For a cross-section showing under-representation along 
race/ethnicity lines in one music-heavy locality, see The Austin Music Census, 
AUSTINTEXAS.GOV (June 1, 2015) https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/
Austin_Music_Census_Interactive_PDF_53115.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ9W-ABAQ]. 
268 Recent reporting suggests that only very incremental progress has been made. See 
Tatiana Cirisano, ‘Starting to See Change’: USC Annenberg Study Finds Small Shift 
Toward a More Inclusive Music Industry, BILLBOARD (Jan. 21, 2020), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8548504/usc-annenberg-study-inclusion-
women-industry-gender-gap [https://perma.cc/5KF3-MYH6]. 
269 See, e.g., Naomi Larsson, Live Music Acts Are Mostly Male-Only. What’s Holding 
Women Back?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
inequality/2017/oct/12/tonights-live-music-acts-will-mostly-be-male-only-whats-holding-
women-back [https://perma.cc/REY5-H96Z]; Racial / Ethnic and Gender Diversity in the 
Orchestra Field, LEAGUE OF AMERICAN ORCHESTRAS (Sept. 2016), http://www.ppv.
issuelab.org/resources/25840/25840.pdf [https://perma.cc/678V-ZN4N]. 
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have begun preemptively seeking interpolation licenses. The fear 
felt among creators is also being felt by their representatives.  
Indeed, when Miguel warned about “standing on the shoulders of 
giants,”270 it was in the context of explaining his team’s decision to 
proactively seek to license an old Smashing Pumpkins song they had 
determined Miguel’s new work resembled.271 “Everyone  
is being a little more cautious,” an executive told Billboard.272  
“Nobody wants to be involved in a lawsuit.”273 So far, predictions 
in the immediate aftermath of Blurred Lines that “we are more likely 
to see preemptive writing credits given to original composers whose 
works are allegedly infringed” appear to have been prophetic.274 
This pragmatic, risk-averse response may mitigate any chilling ef-
fect on composers’ creativity by lessening their exposure to poten-
tial infringement liability. 
B. Pros and Cons of Unrestricted Sound Recording Use in 
Composition Infringement Trials 
Sound recordings play an uneasy role in the debate over what 
falls under the “composition” banner. Proponents of the broader def-
inition may look more favorably upon the evidentiary use of sound 
recordings, since they encourage a jury to evaluate everything (pro-
tected and unprotected). Proponents of narrower protection may 
look less favorably upon the evidentiary use of sound  
recordings for the same reason: recordings convey more than these 
 
270 See Miguel, supra note 233. 
271 Kyle Anderson, Billy Corgan Explains His Miguel Writing Credit for ‘Leaves’, 
ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY (July 22, 2015, 9:27 PM), https://ew.com/article/2015/07/22/
billy-corgan-explains-miguel-leaves-writing-credit/ [https://perma.cc/V4UP-KR89]. 
272 Ed Christman, ‘Uptown Funk!’ Gains More Writers After Gap Band’s Legal Claim, 
BILLBOARD (May 1, 2015, 12:21 AM), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/
6553522/uptown-funk-gains-more-writers-after-gap-bands-legal-claim [https://perma.cc/
VWY4-PWSC]; see also Lynskey, supra note 83 (musing that one cause of the 
proliferation of credited songwriters per work “can be found in lawyers’ offices”). 
273 Id. 
274 Megan Coane & Maximillian Verrelli, Blurring Lines? The Practical Implications of 
Williams v. Bridgeport Music, AM. BAR. ASS’N. (Jan. 2016), https://www.american
bar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/2015-16/january-
february/blurring_lines_the_practical_implications_of_williams_v_bridgeport_music/ 
[https://perma.cc/WU52-YKEZ]. The prediction that there would be “fewer lawsuits 
overall in response to this dangerous precedent” appears to have been less accurate. See id. 
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proponents wish the jury to hear. But in reality, the use of sound 
recordings is a discrete issue from the scope of a composition. Sound 
recordings will always contain non-compositional elements. Thus, 
the evidentiary calculus boils down to any individual sound record-
ing’s usefulness, compared to the inherent risks of exposing jurors 
to the unprotected material it communicates. 
1. Pros: Arguments for the Unrestricted Use of Sound 
Recordings in Composition Infringement Trials 
The realities of the modern music industry loom large over this 
discussion, and recent history tends to weigh in favor of the eviden-
tiary use of recordings in composition infringement trials.  
Increasingly, popular composition happens through the recording 
process, not prior to it, with songwriters, producers, and artists  
(indeed, the same person often occupies multiple of these titles) 
“creating, manipulating, and sending digital music files back and 
forth . . . to create a composition that is purely aural and digital.”275 
a) Unrestricted Sound Recording Use Reflects Evolving 
Creative Practices 
As a result of this convergence, the most honest and contempo-
raneous manifestation of a composition is often the sound recording 
that was created as a part of the compositional process.276 Written 
reductions of the work are increasingly simplistic, retroactive recon-
structions of a pre-existing sound recording.277 There are also  
substantive compositional achievements that can only be achieved 
through the recording process. Sound recordings, in modern prac-
tice, have become a frontier for creativity; rather than striving  
to faithfully and transparently capture performances verbatim,  
recordings have “become a focus of creative effort and [a] unit of 
creative production in [their] own right.”278 From the opening chord 
of “A Hard Day’s Night,” to “the use of compressors and noise gates 
to create the 1980s gated drum sound,” to the millennial repurposing 
of Auto-Tune as a creative apparatus, core achievements that are 
 
275 See Social Justice, supra note 66, at 36. 
276 See id. 
277 See id. 
278 See Brauneis, supra note 30, at 24–25. 
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central to the audience’s perception of the composition are increas-
ingly native to recording technology.279 Thus, as composition and 
sound recording become more intertwined, it becomes less plausi-
ble, and less useful, to separate them at trial. 
b) The Limitations and Drawbacks of Written 
Reductions280 
Even setting aside these new creative frontiers, one need not 
search long in order to uncover the many drawbacks of reliance on 
written reductions of musical compositions, particularly in the pop-
ular music context. At its best, “[w]estern notation deals poorly with 
certain aspects of musical expression, like dynamics, attack, and 
timbre . . . which are necessarily approximate and suggestive, rather 
than precise and prescriptive.”281 Plus, to be sure, written reductions 
of pop music rarely enjoy the best of western notation practices.  
Because such a miniscule percentage of musical works are ever  
embroiled in infringement proceedings, the primary purpose for 
which lead sheets are prepared is to serve as commercial charts 
which are distributed for use by consumer instrumentalists.282  
Unsurprisingly, these reductions are rarely prepared with the due 
care that their composer, let alone their composer’s attorney, would 
wish for a potentially load-bearing legal document.283 
 
279 See id. at 20–21, 27–28. 
280 The policy considerations discussed in Part III are largely similar for both pre- and 
post-1978 works. This is one exception. The influence of written reductions is greater for 
pre-1978 works because of the bureaucratic requirement that their deposit copies be 
visually notated. See supra Part II.C.3. This cuts both ways: the inherent drawbacks to 
written reductions loom larger for the pre-1978 works compelled to rely on them, but so 
too do the predictability and clarity rationales for tying protectability to a single, federally 
anointed written iteration of the work. See generally United States, supra note 127. 
Allowing sound recordings to serve as deposit copies softens these drawbacks, but also 
sacrifices some of that clarity; it ratifies the basic tension inherent to using a sound 
recording as an inexact facsimile of the composition copyright it embodies. See infra notes 
308–25 and accompanying text. 
281 Brauneis, supra note 30, at 10 (quoting MICHAEL CHANAN, MUSICA PRACTICA 5–6 
(1994)). 
282 See Baker, supra note 115, at 1599. 
283 See id. (“The information which has been left out may in fact be of such importance 
to the song itself that a finding of infringement would not occur if a different reduction of 
the music was used.”). 
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Additionally, because so many songwriters are not literate in for-
mal European musical notation (or choose to compose in other for-
mats), many written reductions that are used as deposit copies are 
merely rough transcriptions of recordings of the composition, jotted 
down at some point by an industry scribe.284 Thus, “[t]he result 
might or might not accurately represent the actual melody and 
chords composed, and might include or omit other important, origi-
nal elements of the composition.”285 
Written reductions also fail to do justice to the way in which 
music is actually experienced by listeners. “Most listeners do not 
break down musical compositions into their significant formal  
elements as they listen.”286 Only through experiencing a perfor-
mance that ties together the separate elements can an audience  
access music’s “unique relational system” allowing for a “meaning-
ful experience.”287 This is especially significant for juries tasked 
with evaluating the “total concept and feel” of two works.288 
Reliance on notated music also spawns an inequitable system 
where protection may hinge on the composer’s fluency in European 
staff notation. “[This] disfavors those outside that particular music 
tradition.”289 In fact, the inability to read or write traditional Euro-
pean music notation is a trait shared by many of the most  
successful popular artists in history.290 More insidiously, classes of 
creators disproportionately disadvantaged by this formal standard 
include black musicians, other musicians of color, musicians from 
underprivileged backgrounds with less access to classical music 
 
284 See Social Justice, supra note 66, at 16–17. 
285 Id at 17. 
286 David May, Note, “So Long As Time Is Music”: When Musical Compositions Are 
Substantially Similar, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 795 (1987). 
287 Id. 
288 See Jenkins, supra note 7. 
289 Social Justice, supra note 66, at 41–42, 55. 
290 See, e.g., 7 Famous Musicians—Who Can’t Read Music, MUSIC STUDIO (Nov. 8, 
2017), https://www.themusicstudio.ca/blog/2017/11/909/ [https://perma.cc/N7SS-
W6CN]. Notably, Marvin Gaye was another member of that club. See Social Justice, supra 
note 66, at 40–41 (“If Gershwin could notate for old-fashioned car squeeze bulb horns . . . 
why could Gaye not also enjoy protection for . . . cowbells and background voices?”). 
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education, and musicians from traditions where playing “by ear”  
is common.291 
Furthermore, beyond the musical accuracy issues discussed 
herein, copyright ownership inaccuracies have also resulted from 
the removal of the actual composer from the registration process. 
“[M]any marginalized composers, especially those of color and out-
side . . . the European staff notation tradition” were exploited in the 
twentieth century by gatekeepers who would either omit the true 
composer from the registration altogether, or fabricate phantom co-
authors to cut into the true author’s ownership interest in the 
work.292 By imposing fewer restrictions on the evidentiary use of 
sound recordings, courts can reduce copyright’s overall reliance on 
written reductions of compositions, and thus alleviate these prob-
lematic symptoms.293 
c) Expert Methodology 
The Federal Rules of Evidence’s treatment of expert testimony 
provides additional support for fewer restrictions on the use of sound 
recordings in composition infringement trials. Expert musicologists 
are trained in the study and theory of music, an aural  
medium. To strip them of the right to offer testimony evaluating mu-
sical expression in its native medium—sound recordings—is to de-
prive them, in the words of Rule 703, of the primary “facts or data” 
 
291 See Social Justice, supra note 66, at 17–18; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Professor Sean 
M. O’Connor and Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice (IIPSJ) in Support 
of Plaintiff-Appellant at 29, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 
16–56057, 16–56287), 2019 WL 2996343 (identifying “inherently American music art 
forms such as jazz, country, bluegrass, R&B, and rock and roll” as traditions where many 
“first rank” composers did not write in European notation: “[t]heir compositions lived and 
breathed” on record). 
292 Social Justice, supra note 66, at 16–17. See K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black 
Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 368 (1999) 
(documenting a systemic and “pervasive history of infringement” of works by black 
creators). 
293 For a contrary view defending the continued reliance on written notation, see Cronin, 
supra note 34, at 227–28 (advocating limiting protection to the “long-established view” 
equating compositional protection to “melody, harmony, and rhythm” as indicated in 
written musical notation: “Musicians who assemble works . . . from sequences of recorded 
sounds cannot access the space, or long-range perspective, of visual representations that 
enable the creation of more musically complex works.”). 
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that members of the musicology field “reasonably rely on” both in-
side and outside of litigation.294 In other words, depriving musicol-
ogists of the ability to rely upon the precise medium that is so central 
to their expertise counteracts a major policy aim underlying eviden-
tiary expert testimony rules: to replicate extrajudicial methodology 
in judicial contexts.295 
Furthermore, expert musicologists comprise a significant  
expense for all litigants—an extra tax atop the other costs and  
uncertainties inherent to litigating these types of cases.296 Every re-
striction on the use of sound recordings, or content contained 
therein, erects an additional hurdle that requires additional musical 
manipulation. For every sound recording that is barred from the 
courtroom, another aural representation of the work, presumably ei-
ther prepared or performed by the musicologist, must take its place. 
This, in turn, further increases both the parties’ reliance on their ex-
pensive experts and the experts’ ultimate influence on the outcome 
of the trial.297 
d) Using Sound Recordings Is Just Simpler 
Finally, in many ways, the use of sound recordings in composi-
tion infringement litigations is simply easier than the alternative. 
Music is an aural art form, and the experience of consuming a work 
of music cannot accurately be mimicked via other sensory 
 
294 Fed. R. Evid. 703. 
295 Fed. R. Evid. 703 (advisory committee’s note). 
296 See Nicholas Vennekotter, Note, Full Cost in Translation: Awarding Expert Witness 
Fees in Copyright Litigation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721, 1737 (2019). 
297 Judicial skepticism surrounding the influence of expert testimony on copyright 
litigation has a long and storied history. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 
F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930) (reasoning that expert testimony “ought not be allowed at all” 
because it “greatly extends the trial and contributes nothing which cannot be better heard 
after the evidence is all submitted”). Per Judge Learned Hand, beyond “cumber[ing] the 
case and tend[ing] to confusion,” expert testimony distracts the jury with “the intricacies 
of dramatic craftsmanship,” in place of “the firmer, if more naive, ground of [the jury’s] 
considered impressions upon its own perusal.” Id. Some modern scholars have explored 
the notion of a specialized copyright tribunal, more schooled in music’s formal 
complexities than today’s courts and juries, and less reliant upon experts. See García, supra 
note 252. This proposal underscores a key point that can be easily misplaced when 
discussing the drawbacks of lay juries: they apply to lay judges too. See Lund, supra note 
26, at 173–74. 
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channels.298 It follows that the surgery of dissecting two works of 
music, and probing one for similarities to the other, can benefit from 
being performed within that same format. There is certainly also 
value to the use of visual formats; but of course, allowing audio 
comparisons does not preclude other means of comparison.299 
Not only is music an aural medium, but it is one that is experi-
enced holistically.300 Listeners do not perceive a musical work as 
merely the sum of its parts.301 To the contrary, their experience flows 
from “the way in which the musical elements relate to each 
other.”302 Ham-handed attempts to separate protected wheat from 
unprotected chaff can endanger the entire crop. 
Juries also “tend to give more credence to demonstrations that 
are easier to understand.”303 Allowing them access to a medium they 
are familiar with—recordings—can simplify otherwise complicated 
proceedings for them.304 Moreover, because it is unreasonable to ex-
pect juries to opine on substantial similarity without hearing some 
kind of aural representation of the compositions at issue, any re-
striction on the recordings that can be used increases the burden on 
all parties—especially the party with the burden of proof—to con-
trive less straightforward aural demonstrations in place of readily 
available recordings.305 
 
298 See Brauneis, supra note 30, at 45 (“Courts have frequently noted that music is 
fundamentally an aural experience and that one has to engage in acts of listening to 
determine whether two musical works are substantially similar.”). 
299 See generally Baker, supra note 115, at 1633. 
300 See May, supra note 286, at 795. 
301 See id. (“Most listeners do not break down musical compositions into their significant 
formal elements as they listen.”). 
302 Id. 
303 Baker, supra note 115, at 1612. 
304 Musicologists’ visual demonstrations can be particularly challenging for lay jurors to 
follow. See id. at 1608–14. 
305 See Plaintiffs’ Objection and Companion Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Defendants’ First Motion in Limine and Memorandum of Law in Support of Their First 
Motion in Limine, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2019), 2019 
WL 2604573 (“To suggest that [not] playing the sound recording is likely to result in less 
confusion for a jury is, in a word, absurd.”) (emphasis added). 
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2. Cons: Arguments for More Restricted Use of Sound 
Recordings in Composition Infringement Trials 
On the other hand, the danger posed by making things procedur-
ally easier for lay jurors is that this may then spur their natural pre-
disposition to misconstrue recordings—which are “intended only as 
a vehicle for presenting evidence of the underlying musical compo-
sition”—as equivalent to their underlying compositions.306 
a) Practical Difficulties 
For all the “ordinary,” “reasonable” language embedded in pre-
vailing substantial similarity standards,307 attempting to aurally and 
contemporaneously pluck only protected, compositional elements 
from a recording is anything but “ordinary.” Sound recordings inev-
itably “invite[] the juror to make the wrong comparison by compar-
ing the sound recordings rather than the compositional elements  
underlying each recording.”308 Recordings are simply not honest 
brokers of the compositions they embody. A recording is just as 
likely to resemble another recording that embodies an entirely  
different composition309 as it is to differ from a separate recording 
of the exact same composition.310 The resultant risks to judicial fair-
ness read directly out of Rule 403: “unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, misleading the jury.”311 
 
306 See Lund, supra note 26, at 148–49. 
307 See supra Part II.C.1. 
308 Lund, supra note 26, at 149. 
309 See, e.g., Tyler Cooper, This Is How You Remind Me of Someday, YOUTUBE (Jan. 10, 
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvujgcbaCF8 [https://perma.cc/4DWB-
NDZV]. 
310 Compare Vintage.TV, Don’t Think Twice It’s All Right—Bob Dylan, YOUTUBE (June 
27, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-Y3KfJs6T0 [https://perma.cc/PXC5-
GWGZ], with Xenia, Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right—Kesha (Bob Dylan Tribute), 
YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mNCEV7ZSNFo 
[https://perma.cc/R3U5-Q3ME], and Siegfried Deniz, Frankie Valli & 4 Seasons 10 Don’t 
Think Twice, It’s Alright, YOUTUBE (June 29, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=KerQKsX0zlw [https://perma.cc/SW6P-4MCQ]. 
311 Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
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b) Jury Confusion 
Lay juries are “notoriously ill-suited” to the complexities of mu-
sical similarity analysis.312 Many commentators have speculated 
that the Blurred Lines jurors, in spite of the district court’s formal 
restrictions, were swayed by the two recordings’ stylistic similari-
ties.313 More generally, there is significant cause to be skeptical 
about jurors’ ability to parse composition from recording. When pop 
records resemble one another to the average listener, it is often due 
to production similarities.314 “Melody often doesn’t do anywhere 
near as much of the lay listener’s heavy lifting as copyright tradi-
tionally assumes.”315 Ultimately, listeners’ ears tend to gravitate 
 
312 García, supra note 252; see also Gabriel A. Radvansky et al., Timbre Reliance in 
Nonmusicians’ and Musicians’ Memory for Melodies, 13 MUSIC PERCEPTION: AN 
INTERDISC. J. 127, 127–28 (1995) (discussing nonmusicians’ relative inability, compared 
with musicians, to focus on specific musical features, disaggregate musical elements from 
one another, and “structure their mental representation” of music). 
313 See, e.g., Lattanza, supra note 238, at 725 (“[T]he jury most likely found similarities 
based on the ‘mash-up’ recording of the songs, which . . . contained unprotectable 
elements.”); Madison, supra note 7, at 193 (2019) (“What makes the recordings of ‘Got to 
Give It Up’ and ‘Blurred Lines’ sound similar to some listeners is that they have stylistic 
similarities.”); Jenkins, supra note 7 (arguing that “it is very difficult to compare ‘total 
concept and feel’ without erroneously taking into account all of the unprotectable 
elements” present in the “Got to Give It Up” recording, including stylistic elements Gaye 
may have “copied directly from his Motown, funk, or disco predecessors,” basic chord 
progressions, and other “scènes à faire”). The Ninth Circuit itself expressed this concern at 
oral argument. Oral Argument, supra note 184 (expressing the eventually dissenting Judge 
Nguyen’s concern that exposure to unprotected recorded elements might “unduly sway the 
jurors”). 
314 See Fishman, supra note 15, at 1903. 
315 Id.; see Carys Craig & Guillaume Laroche, Out of Tune: Why Copyright Law Needs 
Music Lessons, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
APPROACHES 43, 58 (B. Courtney Doagoo et al. eds., 2014) (“Our ears are biologically 
hardwired to believe two violin melodies are more alike than two melodies for two different 
instruments.”); Rita S. Wolpert, Recognition of Melody, Harmonic Accompaniment, and 
Instrumentation: Musicians vs. Nonmusicians, 8 MUSIC PERCEPTION 95 (1990) (reporting 
the results of an empirical study wherein the vast majority of subjects without musical 
training “chose instrumentation over melody and harmonic accompaniment as the salient 
cue for recognition.”). But see Lindsey R. Williams, Effect of Music Training and Musical 
Complexity on Focus of Attention to Melody or Harmony, 53 J. RES. MUSIC EDUC. 210, 
216–17 (2005) (showing, empirically, that melody disproportionately attracts the attention 
of less musically educated listeners, relative to harmony); Caroline Palmer, Listening, 
Imagining, Performing: Melody As a Life Cycle of Musical Thought, 33 MUSIC 
PERCEPTION: AN INTERDISC. J. 3, 9 (2015) (describing melody, in a neuroscience context, 
as the “primary voice that grabs listeners’ attention”); Gino Stefani, Melody: A Popular 
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more towards the “sound-character” of a recording than to its em-
bedded compositional elements.316 Crucially, once the jury has at-
tached “undue weight to irrelevant similarities between the  
recordings . . . [t]he proverbial bell cannot be un-rung.”317 
c) Jury Manipulation 
Beyond the passive inevitability of jury confusion, the risk of 
deliberate jury manipulation by musicologists also warrants moni-
toring. There is nothing particularly sinister about this manipulation; 
experts, like attorneys, are retained to rhetorically position their cli-
ent’s case in the most favorable light. But, uniquely, the musicolo-
gist is often the only party in the room fluent in their subject mat-
ter.318 This dynamic presents special dangers, which in turn warrant 
more vigilant oversight.319 
A skilled musicologist can mold many dimensions of a record-
ing in order to maximize, or minimize, its similarities to another 
 
Perspective, 6 POPULAR MUSIC 21 (1987) (noting that melody is the singular “dimension 
of music which everyone can easily appropriate in many ways: with the voice by singing, 
whistling or putting words to it; with the body by dancing, marching, etc.”). 
316 See David Horn, Some Thoughts on the Work in Popular Music, in THE MUSICAL 
WORK: REALITY OR INVENTION? 14, 25 (Michael Talbot ed., 2000). 
317 Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of their First Motion in 
Limine, Griffin v. Sheeran, No.1:17–CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2019), 2019 WL 
3362228. Although courts may attempt to mitigate these concerns with limiting 
instructions (see supra note 207 and accompanying text), both the subject-matter-specific 
and broader legal literature are replete with skepticism as to whether these instructions have 
any meaningful effect. See, e.g., Madelyn Chortek, The Psychology of Unknowing: 
Inadmissible Evidence in Jury and Bench Trials, 32 REV. LITIG. 117, 126 (2013) (“On the 
whole, there is consensus that ‘when people attempt to ignore inadmissible information of 
which they are aware in making decisions or arriving at judgments . . . they frequently will 
be unsuccessful.’”) (quoting Chris Guthrie et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible 
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1262 
(2005)); Fleet, supra note 224, at 1279 n.211 (“The naive assumption that prejudicial 
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be 
unmitigated fiction.”) (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 
318 See Musicians, supra note 135, at 12–13 (“Musicologists speak a language that is 
often foreign to judges (and juries).”). 
319 Contra supra notes 296–97 and accompanying text. 
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work: tempo, key, pitch, arrangement, mixing effects, etc.320 Vin-
tage matters too: recordings from disparate eras evince sonic differ-
ences that can allow a musicologist to mask compositional similari-
ties, and vice versa.321 The same holds true for instrumentation.322 
Critically, the jury “does not have the required education to evaluate 
the relative reliability” of these tactics.323 
The manipulation risks are especially pronounced for mash-ups. 
For example, the Gaye estate’s mash-up in Blurred Lines “sounds 
as if the melody to ‘Blurred Lines’ seamlessly floats over the top of 
the accompaniment to ‘Got to Give It Up.’”324 While “[t]o a music 
theorist, the mash-up sounds grindingly dissonant,” such technical 
critiques might be lost on a lay listener enraptured by mere align-
ment.325 Indeed, musicologists themselves harbor significant doubts 
regarding the general legitimacy of mash-ups as evidence.326 With-
out rigorous judicial oversight, there is no check on the potential 
influence they can wield with recordings at trial. 
IV. THE WAY YOU MOVE: INTRODUCING THE “TRIAD” APPROACH 
Seeking to respect the historical trends discussed in Parts I and 
II, and to properly calibrate the policy arguments explored in Part 
 
320 See Baker, supra note 115, at 1587 (describing musicologist testimony as “typically 
designed to obscure or highlight similarities, and to divert the jury’s attention from more 
reliable music interpretations”). 
321 See id. at 1610. 
322 Id. (illustrating that a modern recording of the London Symphony Orchestra, set 
against a “little 18-piece ensemble in 1953 with very crude performing technology” can 
create the impression of “apples to oranges” even when the underlying compositions are 
“apples to apples”). 
323 Id. at 1587. 
324 Madison, supra note 7, at 193. 
325 See id. Experts often offer dueling mash-ups, with a typical plaintiffs’ mash-up 
designed to emphasize the similarities between the two works at issues, and the typical 
defendants’ mash-up designed to “illustrate that any similarities between the works at issue 
can [also] be detected in other modern, pop songs performed in the same meter.” See, e.g., 
Cottrill v. Spears, No. CIV.A. 02–3646, 2003 WL 21223846, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 
2003), aff’d, 87 F. App’x 803 (3d Cir. 2004), as amended on reh’g (June 2, 2004). 
326 See, e.g., Colorado Law, Colorado Law Live Stream, YOUTUBE (Mar. 5, 2020), at 
time stamp 1:27:27, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6-WlVS4DnpY&t=87m27s 
[https://perma.cc/Y7PW-AWYY] (Musicologists Dr. Alex Stewart and Dr. Sandy Wilbur 
responding to the author’s question regarding the use of mash-ups as evidence). 
2020] FRE-BIRD 1375 
 
III, this Note argues for more stringent judicial monitoring of the use 
of sound recordings in copyright infringement trials. As the recent 
leading cases show, the real-world implications of these  
evidentiary decisions are as functionally important as the doctrine 
developed along the way.327 To that end, this Note’s proposal  
explicitly links the doctrinal to the evidentiary—it ties the formal to 
the functional.328 
For the same reasons, this Note also advocates de-emphasizing 
evidentiary reliance upon strict categories of protectable and  
unprotectable elements within specific compositions.329 Irrespective 
of the abstract wisdom of these categories, in reality, the mingling 
of composition and recording creativity—particularly in the pres-
ence of compilation claims330—has gelded the “filtering out” pro-
cess.331 This makes it difficult for the protectability issue to have a 
meaningful real-world impact on evidentiary decisions. As demon-
strated in Blurred Lines, the current approach allows courts, where 
protectability is disputed, to leave its resolution to the jury, and thus 
err on the side of the jury hearing more rather than less.332 The cir-
cularity of this model carries an inherent risk, as explained above: 
jurors cannot unhear what they have already heard.333 
Instead, this Note advocates acknowledging the ongoing sunset-
ting of meaningful bright-line protectability rules, and instead  
encourages courts to impose a sliding-scale, fact-specific composi-
tionality determination to allocate the relative burdens placed on 
each party for evidentiary offerings.334 The three steps of the 
 
327 See supra Part II.D. 
328 For a non-evidentiary proposal, see Professors, supra note 255, at 1, 19–25 (proposing 
imposing a “virtual identity” similarity requirement for claims that involve compilations 
of unprotectable elements). 
329 See supra Part II.A. 
330 See supra Part II.B.1. 
331 See supra Part II.C.2. 
332 See supra notes 165, 181–82 and accompanying text. 
333 See Defendants’ Reply, supra note 317 and accompanying text; supra Part III.B.2. 
334 See supra Part II.A. For a discussion on how burdens typically operate in copyright 
infringement cases, see Lydia Pallas Loren & R. Anthony Reese, Proving Infringement: 
Burdens of Proof in Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 621, 
632 (2019). Importantly, this Note does not advocate a wholesale rejection of formal 
protectability, which remains useful for ensuring that certain elements correctly remain in 
the public domain, in spite of their compositional nature. See supra notes 115, 121 and 
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proposed “Triad”335 judicial approach, for any given contested  
recorded element, are: (1) to what extent is the recorded element in 
question compositional in nature, or to what extent does the full  
recording in question contain non-compositional elements? This  
inquiry, in turn, determines the relative burdens placed on each party 
in the later steps; (2) in what ways is the given recording, or recorded 
element, probative of the composition that is alleged to have been 
infringed; and (3) in what ways could the recording, or recorded  
element, be prejudicial, confusing, or misleading for a jury’s sub-
stantial similarity analysis? 
Like Rule 403, Steps Two and Three of the Triad approach  
undertake an express evaluation of the probative value versus the 
prejudicial risks of the putative evidence. However, unlike Rule 403, 
which calls for relevant evidence to be admitted unless the probative 
value is “substantially outweighed” by prejudice, confusion, or  
delay, the Triad approach contemplates a more flexible burden.336 
A. Triad Step One: “Compositionality” Spectrum 
In Step One of the Triad approach, courts consider the extent to 
which a recorded element is compositional in nature. The more com-
positional the element, the less onerous the burden faced by the pro-
ponent of the evidence to get that element admitted. Conversely, the 
less compositional the recorded element, the greater its proponent’s 
burden becomes to admit that element into evidence. 
An array of non-dispositive factors may be relevant to determin-
ing where on the compositionality spectrum an element falls. These 
include: (1) the manner of musical contribution at issue (melody, 
harmony, performance, timbre, arrangement, production, mixing, 
etc.); (2) whether the parties subjectively considered these contribu-
tions to be compositional; (3) the extent to which this kind of con-
tribution is typically considered to be compositional; (4) the 
 
accompanying text; Fishman, supra note 231, at 1381 (“A maximalist copyright law shorn 
of . . . the scènes à faire doctrine, and other safeguards for borrowing and quotation would 
cast a long shadow not just over what society creates but also how society creates.”). 
335 The triad, “a chord made up of three tones . . . [,] is the basis of tonal harmony in 
music.” Triad, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/art/triad-music 
[https://perma.cc/79XV-UDYN]. 
336 Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
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presence, or absence, of this element in other iterations of the work, 
including demos, live performances, covers, and written reductions 
(deposited and otherwise);337 (5) the identity of the parties that made 
the contribution, and whether they are credited as songwriters; (6) 
the work’s overall compositional process and chronology; and (7) 
the process and chronology through which the element at issue was 
added to the recording, and how that process and chronology inter-
acted with the compositional process and chronology. In addition to 
this non-exhaustive list, judges may consider whether any policy 
implications like those discussed in Part III—particularly social jus-
tice considerations such as the presence of racial appropriation or 
pilfering—weigh in favor of compositionality. 
Excerpts from Ed Sheeran’s Thinking Out Loud deposition pro-
vide a useful illustration of several of the compositionality ele-
ments.338 Sheeran describes the initial songwriting process under-
taken with co-writer Amy Wadge, and distinguishes their composi-
tional creations conceived during a songwriting session at his house 
from production elements added later by producer Jake Gosling  
during a studio session.339 Sheeran remarks that “the song itself is a 
guitar and a vocal. . . . [I]f you put bass or drums or piano on it, that 
was [Gosling’s] production . . . not songwriting.”340 
Sheeran’s testimony speaks directly to factor (2)—a party’s sub-
jective understanding that the drums and bass were not composi-
tional—as well as factor (5)—the identity and status of the contrib-
utor (in this case the drums and bass were conceived by Gosling, 
who is not one of the two credited songwriters on “Thinking Out 
Loud”).341 It also lays the chronological foundations relevant to  
factors (6) and (7).342 The demo recording from Sheeran and 
 
337 Importantly, factors (3) and (4) are the only two that invite expert testimony. The 
others are primarily factual inquiries. The Triad method thus carries the benefit of reducing 
experts’ influence on the outcome, as well as on the parties’ expert-related expenses. See 
supra notes 296–97 and accompanying text. 
338 Exhibit 9, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 1:17–CV–05221 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2018), ECF 
No. 67–9. 
339 Id. at 6–7 (answering “yes” to this question: “To your understanding, [after the writing 
session] you had written the song and the song was complete?”). 
340 Id. at 7. 
341 See Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 3d 492, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
342 Exhibit 9, supra note 338, at 6–8. 
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Wadge’s initial writing session would also be relevant to factor 
(4).343 Taken together, these factors suggest that the drums and bass 
are not particularly compositional. Under the Triad approach, then, 
were the “Thinking Out Loud” writers to allege infringement against 
creators of a future work, they would have to satisfy a higher proba-
tive burden (Step Two) to introduce recordings that included  
Gosling’s drums and bass, and their opponents would face a lower 
prejudicial burden (Step Three) to preclude those recorded elements. 
The Triad approach’s sliding-scale compositionality inquiry  
begins with a rebuttable presumption that, absent a showing of  
other factors, limits the composition to the narrow, songwriter- 
consensus, melody-centric view. This presumption vindicates  
music’s “building block” nature,344 and facilitates new creativity by 
promoting simplicity, predictability and stability345—and also by 
quelling creators’ anxieties346 surrounding the copyrightability of 
grooves, genres, and other core musical ideas.347 At the same time, 
by allowing this presumption to be rebutted by a number of non-
dispositive factors, the Triad approach’s attempted compromise re-
spects the reality that in many contexts, composition and recording 
are becoming inherently more difficult to separate.348 It also affords 
courts the flexibility to counteract the exclusionary injustices that 
can occur as side-effects of the narrower view of compositional-
ity.349 Fundamentally, this middle-ground approach allows judges, 
on a case-by-case basis, to link any of the policy arguments sur-
rounding compositionality directly and explicitly to the evidentiary 
decisions that so often shape these verdicts.350 
 
343 See Exhibit 6, supra note 214. 
344 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
345 See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text. 
346 See supra notes 230–39 and accompanying text. 
347 See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. In this way, it operates similarly to 
limiting scope of copyright to a written deposit copy, but with the added benefit of applying 
meaningfully to post-1978 works. See supra note 280. 
348 See supra Part I. 
349 See supra notes 259–69 and accompanying text. 
350 See supra Part II.D. 
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B. Triad Steps Two and Three: Probative v. Prejudicial Burdens 
The subsequent evidentiary steps for contested recordings/ 
recorded elements echo a traditional Rule 403 analysis,351 differing 
only in the variable burden that they impose upon the parties, as  
determined in Step One’s compositionality inquiry. The less  
compositional the element, the greater the showing of probative 
value (Step Two) necessary to achieve admission of the recorded 
element. The more compositional the element, the greater the  
showing of prejudicial risk (Step Three) necessary to preclude  
admission of the recorded element. 
To illustrate: Marvin Gaye’s vocal performance of a melody  
encompasses two traditionally compositional elements—a work’s 
central melody, and its accompanying lyrics. However, it also bun-
dles performance elements that are not traditionally compositional: 
vocal performance techniques, tone, timbre, and vocal production. 
Under the Triad approach, a party seeking to preclude admission of 
Marvin Gaye’s vocal performance of vocal melody and lyrics— 
elements that are highly compositional352—would have to show a 
higher risk of prejudice (presumably posed by the bundled, mini-
mally compositional vocal performance and production elements) 
than, for example, a party seeking to preclude elements that are pre-
sumptively less compositional, such as a production vocal reverb or 
guitar distortion. 
Additionally, under Step Three, where there is a risk of prejudi-
cial effect, courts may look to whether there are less prejudicial 
means of conveying the same probative information. This allows 
courts to consider the ease with which an element could be  
re-recorded, re-edited, re-mixed, performed live to the jury, or con-
veyed via other similarly probative means less obscured by  
unprotected similarities (or, conversely, by irrelevant dissimilarities 
that unduly distract from compositional similarity).353 
 
351 See supra Part II.C.3. 
352 See Fishman, supra note 15, at 1872. 
353 This also provides an avenue for courts to factor in the influence, and expense, 
wielded by experts. See supra notes 296–97 and accompanying text. Together, these 
benefits should outweigh the costs associated with any additional procedural complexity 
that the Triad approach may inject into pretrial (e.g. more intricate motions in limine, or 
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The furthering, under Steps Two and Three, of the middle 
ground approach established in Step One allows courts to embrace 
the ethos of Rule 403: striving to maximize factfinders’ access to 
helpful information, while minimizing their exposure to risky  
inputs. Importantly, though, this approach also allows courts to fac-
tor other policy arguments into the risks and rewards of admitting a 
given recorded element.354 
Those risks and rewards will inevitably vary based on the facts 
of a specific case. In some instances, for example, the limitations of 
written reductions will be so overwhelming, or so unjust, that an 
overwhelming risk of jury confusion or manipulation associated 
with a recording should be deemed necessary to trump its probative 
value, and keep the recording out of evidence.355 Similarly, in some 
cases, it may be so practically impossible to convey to the jury a 
composition divorced from its recording,356 that a showing of prej-
udicial risk should have to be astronomical to defeat any showing of 
probative value.357 In other cases, it will be so practically simple to 
isolate and extract a recorded element, with so little an effect on the 
overall aural experience, that a massive showing of probative value 
should be necessary to overcome even a modest showing of preju-
dicial risk.358 Finally, in still other cases, the risks of jury confusion, 
or manipulation, centering around minimally compositional rec-
orded elements will be so profound that practically no showing of 
 
dueling expert compositionality testimony) or intra-trial proceedings. See supra notes 298–
305 and accompanying text. 
354 See supra Part III. The underlying rationale behind the Triad approach is the 
proposition that, if courts exert greater influence at early evidentiary checkpoints, they can 
constrain the factfinder’s range of motion, and thereby regulate the entropic influence that 
lay jurors’ lack of expertise can exert over verdicts. This model does, though, have the 
effect of shifting some of the onus for musical judgment from lay jurors to lay judges, who 
are not necessarily any better equipped to make musical judgments. See supra note 297. 
This is a valid concern. Ideally, however, by simply allowing parties to present arguments 
that go towards the compositionality factors, as well as any surrounding policy concerns, 
courts’ initial threshold evidentiary decision would rely less on lay judges’ ears, and more 
on their well-practiced ability to balance equities. 
355 See supra notes 281–93 and accompanying text. 
356 See, e.g., supra note 52. 
357 See supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text. 
358 Contra supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text. 
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probative value can justify admitting the evidence.359 Because these 
circumstances will necessarily vary from case to case, the Triad ap-
proach offers courts a sensible solution: the flexibility to fashion 
their responses accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
The policies and infrastructure governing music copyright tiptoe 
many inherent tensions. In a perfect world, courts would not have to 
choose between expanding protection for creators’ existing works 
and facilitating their ability to create future works. In a perfect 
world, a simple jury instruction would be enough to ensure that ju-
rors were appropriately influenced by the protected elements of a 
composition embodied in a recording performed to them at trial, and 
not at all prejudiced by unprotected elements. Of course, modern 
copyright governance hardly exists in a perfect world. 
To the contrary, copyright provides, by design, a regulatory 
compromise between owners and users—between existing creations 
and future creators. In order to breathe life into that compromise, 
and to adapt with evolving creative and industry realities, courts 
must be aware of historical complexities, as well as the many policy 
implications inherent to the judicial intersection of composition and 
recording. Courts must then, on a case-by-case basis, determine 
which considerations are the most significant. Regrettably, the pre-
vailing judicial fixation on formal protectability fails to adequately 
navigate these difficult waters. Instead, it has yielded unpredictable 
verdicts, an onslaught of opportunistic infringement claims, and a 
class of creators utterly bewildered as to what they are lawfully per-
mitted to create. By expressly linking “compositionality” to eviden-
tiary determinations, courts can combine predictable structure with 
just flexibility, allowing them to fairly adjudicate immediate contro-
versies, while also encouraging a safe, productive environment for 
the creation of new music. 
 
359 See supra notes 305–25 and accompanying text. 
